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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION
INFORMATION-THEORETIC SECURE OUTSOURCED COMPUTATION IN
DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS
Secure multi-party computation (secure MPC) has been established as the de facto
paradigm for protecting privacy in distributed computation. One of the earliest se-
cure MPC primitives is the Shamir’s secret sharing (SSS) scheme. SSS has many
advantages over other popular secure MPC primitives like garbled circuits (GC) – it
provides information-theoretic security guarantee, requires no complex long-integer
operations, and often leads to more efficient protocols. Nonetheless, SSS receives less
attention in the signal processing community because SSS requires a larger number of
honest participants, making it prone to collusion attacks. In this dissertation, I pro-
pose an agent-based computing framework using SSS to protect privacy in distributed
signal processing. There are three main contributions to this dissertation. First, the
proposed computing framework is shown to be significantly more efficient than GC.
Second, a novel game-theoretical framework is proposed to analyze different types
of collusion attacks. Third, using the proposed game-theoretical framework, specific
mechanism designs are developed to deter collusion attacks in a fully distributed man-
ner. Specifically, for a collusion attack with known detectors, I analyze it as games
between secret owners and show that the attack can be effectively deterred by an
explicit retaliation mechanism. For a general attack without detectors, I expand the
scope of the game to include the computing agents and provide deterrence through
deceptive collusion requests. The correctness and privacy of the protocols are proved
under a covert adversarial model. Our experimental results demonstrate the efficiency
of SSS-based protocols and the validity of our mechanism design.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
While not explicitly stated in the U.S. Constitution, the rights of privacy for many
aspects of our lives including religious beliefs, personal possession, and personal in-
formation are protected under the Bill of Rights. Nonetheless, news about different
forms of privacy invasion has become a daily affair. From sale of personal informa-
tion to identity theft, from Google and YouTube surrendering user data to the mining
of phone metadata by the National Security Agency, the number of ways that our
privacy can be invaded seems to increase at an alarming rate.
One of the reasons for such erosion is the significant advancement in computing
technologies for collecting, storing, and sharing personal information among individ-
uals, private sectors, and government agencies. Anyone can now carry thousands of
songs, hundreds of pictures and hours of videos in a small smart phone, ready to be
exchanged, sometimes unknowingly, with anyone in the world. The focus of privacy
protection often falls on medical or financial records, but it is the multimedia sig-
nals – audio, images, and videos – that are driving the entire market of distributed
computing while their privacy implications remain poorly understood.
The threats, however, are real. The advance in pattern recognition algorithms
such as searchable surveillance or automatic speech recognition systems have turned
the once labor-intensive processes into powerful automated systems. They can easily
recognize objects of interest like faces, voice, and other biometric signals with high fi-
delity. Correlating such information with location data such as geo-tags or RFID and
other information on social networks allows hackers to easily track activities and asso-
ciations of any individuals. The matter is further complicated by the unprecedented
effort of the government in monitoring activities of private citizens to fight terrorism.
It is thus imperative to develop a comprehensive privacy protection framework for
1
personal multimedia data without jeopardizing our homeland security.
While new legislature and policy changes are essential elements of such a frame-
work, technologies are playing an equally pivotal role in safeguarding private informa-
tion. There are two main technical challenges in protecting multimedia data. First,
as signal capturing devices and wireless networks become ubiquitous, diverse applica-
tions from multimedia emails and blogging to large-scale surveillance networks begin
to demand some forms of privacy protection. A comprehensive framework is needed
to identify appropriate sensitive information in different applications, and to provide
different levels of protection depending on the role of each user in the system.
Second, from simple enhancement to sophisticated pattern recognition, multime-
dia data requires various signal-processing operations to become useful. The current
cloud and peer-to-peer (P2P) computing platforms have provided ubiquitous data
storage for multimedia data. The computation by third parties like those cloud and
P2P platforms is called the outsourced computing. Cloud and P2P computing plat-
forms can process large-scale of data from multiple sources in a distributed manner.
The promise of these computing platforms is grounded on its predicted pervasiveness:
Internet customers will contribute their individual data and get useful services from
the computing platforms. Figure 1.1 illustrates the situation of customers utilizing
third parties to process their data, where customers are denoted as User 1, 2, .., N
and the computing agents are operated in either cloud or P2P platforms.
There are a myriad of applications of outsourced computing. Examples include
cloud storage and back up services, like Amazon Simple Storage Service (Amazon
S3) [4], Dropbox [45], MEGA [90], and Carbonite [25]. In the United States of Amer-
ica, the Affordable Care Act (ACA) leverages cloud-based solutions heavily [85]. Due
to the fact that human DNA sequences are very large data sets, computing personally
tailored drugs and personalized medical treatments according to an individual’s DNA
sequence requires huge computing resources which are obtainable from the cloud plat-
2
Figure 1.1: Outsourced Computing Scenario
form. A mobile application was presented for the electronic healthcare data storage,
update and retrieval using Cloud Computing [44]. GraphLab, a framework for ma-
chine learning and data mining in the cloud, was proposed and implemented [86].
To achieve a high quality of service (QoS) provisioning for multimedia service, a
media-edge cloud (MEC) architecture was proposed [140].
1.1 Application Scenario and Privacy Concerns
In the future, software developers will undoubtedly take advantage of the enormous
power of various distributed computing platforms in offering various types of software
services to process data. We consider a distributed computing task to have at least
two participants: a user with a private input requires a service from a vendor with
a proprietary software algorithm. It is easy to see why privacy is needed in any
distributed multimedia processing service platform – the user may want to enhance
or process a video taken using a smart phone but lacks the required capability and
algorithms. The multimedia software vendor offers proprietary software for the job
and charges the user based on the duration of the video needed to be processed.
For simplicity, we assume that the vendor’s secrets are the key parameters used in an
3
otherwise well-known algorithm. For example, the parameters could be the tap values
of a sophisticated filter or thresholds and weights in a neural network. The privacy
objective is as follows: the user and the vendor do not trust each other and would
like to prevent each other from knowing anything about their own secret information.
The two parties come to the cloud server and take advantage of its enormous power
and storage. The user clearly wants to protect any private information in his/her
video while the software vendor needs to prevent theft of its proprietary algorithm.
Outsourced computing can fulfill its promise only if it provides a wide range of
computation tasks while guaranteeing security and privacy for customers’ input data.
The key challenge is to design an appropriate privacy protection scheme so that it
will not compromise any legitimate processing of the data.
Current privacy violation in the outsourced computing is serious. From time to
time, there are reports of cloud platforms being hacked and customers’ sensitive data
compromised. Cloudminr.io, a Bitcoin Cloud Mining service, has been hacked. Its
whole database of users is on sale for 1 Bitcoin [98]. In June 2015, LastPass, the
cloud-based password manager, announced that its network was hacked and sensitive
user information was stolen [121]. The concerns of patient privacy and information
security of the ACA remain high [49]. It will be a disastrous result when the ACA
medical records stored in the cloud are breached. If people’s private medical records
are exposed, victims with some types of diseases may be denied jobs.
1.2 Provable Security Approaches
To overcome the concerns of privacy while utilizing powerful computing resources
from third party platforms, there are two mainstream approaches for distributed
computations on sensitive data with provable security and privacy. They are the
differential privacy framework and the secure multi-party computation (secure MPC)
framework [46, 34]. In the sequel, we provide a brief review of each framework and
4
evaluate their appropriateness as an outsourcing platform for multimedia data.
Differential Privacy
There is a strong need to quantify privacy in the outsourced scenario. Contributors of
data to third-party platforms face several threats to their privacy [114]. Take a person
participating in a large-scale health care study for example. First, the patient’s data
may be recorded and exposed by a malicious application as part of the study. The
malicious application could stealthily write the stolen data into a file and put it on the
Internet. Then the file could be indexed by a search engine and thus further exposed
to the public. Second, even if all computations are done correctly and securely, the
final result itself, such as those common statistics computed in the study, may leak
sensitive information about the patient’s personal medical record. To address the
aforementioned concerns, traditional approaches to data privacy are to sanitize the
data by syntactic anonymization, in which personally identifiable information such as
names, ages, and Social Security numbers are removed. Unfortunately, the approach
of anonymization does not provide provable privacy guarantees. For example, public
releases of anonymized individual datasets, including AOL search logs [1] and the
movie rating records of Netflix subscribers [95], eventually reveal customers’ private
information. They are evidence that na¨ıve anonymization was easy to reverse in
many cases. These incidents motivate a new approach called diferential privacy to
protecting data privacy quantitatively [114].
Differential privacy was proposed for the purpose of enabling systems to draw
inferences from datasets while preserving the privacy and security of the data and
individual identities. Suppose there are n records in a dataset D = (x1, ...,xn), where
each xi is a vector in Rd and represents the data collected from an individual i. The
number of elements, d, in xi can be understood as the d features of an individual.
Differential privacy is defined as follows [118].
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Definition 1.2.1. An algorithmApriv(·) taking values in a set T provides -differential
privacy if
P(Apriv(D) ∈ S) ≤ e · P(Apriv(D′) ∈ S) (1.1)
for all measurable S ⊆ T and all datasets D and D′ differing in a single entry. The
algorithm Apriv(·) provides (, δ)-differential privacy if
P(Apriv(D) ∈ S) ≤ e · P(Apriv(D′) ∈ S) + δ (1.2)
for all measurable S ⊆ T and all datasets D and D′ differing in a single entry.
Privacy parameters are  and δ. The smaller  and δ are , the more privacy Apriv(·)
would ensure [47, 135]. The computation under the differential privacy framework is
in the interactive query model. There are two roles in the computation, one is the
user and the other is the curator of the database D. The user submits queries to the
curator and the latter replies approximate answers.
For the application of the differential privacy framework in signal processing prob-
lems, there has been some progress recently. Rastogi and Nath proposed the first
differential private data aggregation algorithm for distributed time-series data that
offers good practical utility without relying on any trusted server [110]. To ensure
differential privacy while overcoming the poor performance for time-series data by
standard differential privacy techniques, they proposed the Fourier Perturbation Al-
gorithm. FAST, an adaptive system to release real-time aggregate statistics under
the differential privacy framework, was proposed using Kalman filter to improve the
accuracy of data release per time stamp [51].
However, there are some open problems in the area of differential privacy that
makes it inappropriate for the application scenario described in Section 1.1. First,
the differential privacy framework provides approximate results [118], which is not
satisfactory in many signal processing tasks. Second, the choice of the privacy pa-
rameters  and δ has little consensus. While there is heuristics on choosing , the
6
problem of choosing δ for the (, δ) differential privacy defined in 1.2 is poorly under-
stood [48, 54]. Third, there are no differential privacy systems developed for the joint
computation carried out by distrusted parties using their respective private inputs.
Despite the fact that Proserpio et al. proposed distributed algorithms for publication
for graph topologies [108], and McSherry and Mahajan considered the network trace
problem [89], research on the networked information systems in differential privacy is
still at its early stage. Thus, the general scenario in Section 1.1 is not yet ready to
be deployed in the differential privacy framework.
Our focus is on two or more data owners computing jointly to obtain precise
answers. While the differential privacy framework lacks mature joint computation
solutions and provides only approximate results to computing tasks, the secure MPC
framework provides exact outputs. Hence, we are most interested in the approach of
secure MPC.
Secure Multi-Party Computation
Privacy protection in distributed computing enables distrusting parties to participate
in joint computation without revealing their secret data. For example, a small com-
pany can process its confidential customer data using a proprietary software from a
vendor. The standard approach to protect the secrecy of data from all parties in a
joint computation is to use secure multiparty computation or secure MPC protocols.
The goal of secure MPC is to enable multiple distrusted parties, in the absence
of any trusted third parties, to jointly compute a pre-agreed functionality based on
each party’s private input. Many protocols for secure MPC have been proposed
since 1982 [13]. There has been work on various secure MPC protocols for image
denoising [115], joint computation among social network members [58], linear pro-
gramming [127], auction [22], etc.
The simplest form of a secure MPC is a two-party secure computation shown
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in Figure 1.2. The model has two participants, User and Vendor, each has his/her
secret input. They encrypt their respective input using some secure MPC technique,
with the most commonly-used one being the homomorphic encryption (HE) [103] and
the garbled circuits (GC) [138]. Hence, the information exchanged between the two
parties does not disclose any information about the secrets. This is the model used
in encrypted-domain techniques. Data processing operations are to be performed
directly on encrypted signals.
Figure 1.2: Two-party Secure Computation Scenario
Nevertheless, despite being actively researched for more than 30 years, and signif-
icant advancement in the last few years [83, 123, 77], secure MPC protocols are still
rarely used in practical systems since its invention by Yao [138]. The only reported
large-scale application of secure MPC is the Danish sugar beet auction in January
2008 where over 1200 farmers and three servers participated [22]. The execution of
the secure MPC ensured that each bid from a farmer submitted to the auction was
kept secret from the time it left the bidder’s computer. The goal of the secure MPC
system is to efficiently compute the price at which contracts should be traded without
direct access to the actual bidding prices.
One key reason of the lack of practical secure MPC systems is the high compu-
tational costs secure MPC protocols required, especially among those that rely on
encrypted-domain processing. These protocols, classified as computationally secure
multi-party computation (CS-MPC) protocols, achieve their security against any
adversary limited to polynomial computing time. The encrypted-domain algorithms
compute the desired output using only the encrypted input signals. Such techniques
8
have garnered much attention in recent years due to their potentials in various secu-
rity and privacy applications such as biometric matching and privacy-preserving data
mining [106, 82].
The key challenge facing most encrypted-domain DSP systems is the significant
increase in the computational complexity. For example, Yao’s garbled circuits [138]
with its variants is one of the most popular approaches for encrypted-domain DSP.
The best result to-date on the performance of garbled circuit is about 1.6µs per
garble gate or 625000 gates per second [83]. This is minuscule compared to most
modern micro-processors, where even the slowest ones can easily execute billions of
instructions per second.
There are two reasons for the enormous gap between computation in plaintext
and in ciphertext: first, the protection of ciphertext relies on the computational
hardness of certain mathematical problems. To ensure even a short-term protection
against adversaries, a large security parameter needs to be used which results in a
hundred to a thousand-fold increase in the data size. Second, the particular choice
of cryptographic primitives used in the system strongly affects the implementation
complexity of various basic operations. While the performance of certain operations
can be optimized, most other basic operations require more complex procedures and
interaction with secret owners.
An alternative is to use information-theoretic secure MPC (ITS-MPC) protocols.
In these protocols, information exchanged between different parties are statistically
independent of the secret data. As ITS-MPC protocols do not depend on the hardness
of specific computational problems, they often admit faster implementations using a
smaller prime field for data representations [134, 116, 42]. Typical baseline proto-
cols for ITS-MPC include linear secret sharing [84], additive secret sharing [21], and
Shamir’s secret sharing (SSS) [119]. Secret sharing schemes are schemes that decom-
pose a secret number into multiple shares distributed to different parties. Individual
9
shares should not reveal any information about the secret but can be combined to
recreate it.
SSS is among the earliest and most commonly-used ITS-MPC primitives. In SSS,
secret information is first decomposed into multiple random shares using a polynomial
secret sharing scheme. Similar to garbled circuits and homomorphic encryption, SSS
is also homomorphic - computation with respect to addition and multiplication on se-
cret numbers can be carried out through manipulation of the shares. Compared with
encrypted-domain approaches, SSS does not require long keys and its implementa-
tions of basic arithmetic operations are usually much simpler. Unlike those encrypted-
domain approaches, protocols based on SSS can achieve information-theoretic security
– they guarantee security against an adversary with infinite computing power. Di-
rect computation on shares is ideally suitable for privacy and security enhancement
of high data-rate applications such as multimedia processing and data mining. It
has been applied in many areas from typical privacy-enhanced applications such as
auction [22] and private information retrieval [42], to signal-processing applications
including medical data visualization [91], image processing [116] and video surveil-
lance [126].
A drawback of SSS is the need to maintain a fraction of the computational parties
non-colluding [16]. Specifically for SSS, computation is only feasible with at least
three non-colluding semi-honest shareholders. Researchers have long pointed out the
danger of collusion attacks in outsourced computation [40]. In fact, these attacks are
significant real-life problems and occur in many networked applications. In online
Poker and P2P file sharing, cheaters collude to have advantage over other honest
players [59, 80]. PokerStars, one of the the largest online poker cardrooms in the
world, recruits special security personnel to manually investigate special play patterns
to uncover collusion patterns [59], and prohibits players from the same country to be
in the same game [5]. Colluding communication usually exists in two different forms:
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it can occur in side-channels external to the protocols, or as hidden data within,
otherwise known as subliminal communication [2]. Algorithmically, it is impossible
to design protocols to curtail communications over unknown side-channels. Existing
anti-collusion techniques focus on eliminating subliminal communication by relying
on either a semi-honest/trusted centralized server [2, 3] or a specially-designed ballot
box [73]. These require heavy computation at a fortified centralized server, which
defeats the efficiency goal of using SSS based ITS-MPC techniques.
1.3 Contributions
In this dissertation, our main contribution is the collusion deterrence for the ITS-
MPC framework. We propose a collusion-deterred outsourced computing platform
using SSS as a building block. This platform consists of a set of computing agents
that provide computing services for secret-data owners to collaborate on joint com-
putation using secret shares. Collusion, modeled as a covert adversarial behavior, can
occur between one of the data owners and a portion of computing agents, or among
the computing agents themselves. Unlike existing approaches, we model collusion as
games and propose various mechanism designs that lead to honesty as stable strate-
gies. The advantage of our approach is that no centralized server or computationally-
intensive protocols are needed, making our solutions ideal for high-throughput signal
processing applications. Our treatment is also comprehensive because the proposed
models can handle different types of collusion attacks including those that may not
be detected at all by the participants. In this dissertation, we further apply Bayesian
games to better model the uncertainty in data owners’ privacy preference, propose
a new censorship scheme to thwart collusion among computing agents, and provide
additional experimental results to show the efficiency of SSS-based algorithms over
other state-of-the-arts CS-MPC protocols.
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1.4 Dissertation Organization
This dissertation is structured as follows. In Chapter 2 we present the information of
related work for secure MPC, collusion deterrence, and secret sharing. In Chapter 3,
we summarize general operations of signal processing in the secret sharing domain,
specifically, using the Shamir’s secret sharing (SSS). We also describe the secure MPC
based on SSS in terms of its security model, its classification according to the com-
putational power of the adversary, and the computational techniques for building
arithmetic operations. To demonstrate the usefulness of secret sharing domain signal
processing, we propose an application of image denoising through wavelets trans-
form. In Chapter 4 we discuss the collusion attacks under our proposed framework.
In Chapter 5 we propose and analyze our game-theoretic mechanism designs for the
collusion deterrence between customers. In Chapter 6 we describe analyze further
mechanism designs as well as a censorship scheme for the collusion deterrence for
computing agents. Experimental results are presented in Chapter 7. Finally, Chap-
ter 8 concludes this dissertation and points out future directions.
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Chapter 2 Related Work
In this chapter, we provide a review for the area of secure MPC. We survey existing
tools for both computational secure MPC (CS-MPC) and information-theoretic secure
MPC (ITS-MPC). After that, we summarize previous efforts on counter-measuring
collusion attacks in secure MPC protocols. Then we provide an overview of existing
game-theoretic perspectives on secure MPC, which are relevant but different from our
approach. Finally, we finish our review with a discussion of secret sharing schemes.
2.1 Secure MPC Review
The study of secure multiparty computation started in the 1980s [138]. There are four
main types of secure MPC primitives: Garbled Circuits (GC) [138], Homomorphic
Encryption (HE) [111, 57], GMW protocol [61], and BGW protocol [12]. GC is one
of the most well-developed secure MPC protocols. It provides a generic two-party
implementation of any binary function by having one party prepare an encrypted
Boolean circuit, and another party evaluate the circuit using the public-key based
oblivious transfer protocol [75]. In recent years, there have been significant advances
in optimizing the basic GC protocols [70, 77, 123], and in developing novel efficient
hybrid circuits [83, 97].
Homomorphic encryption is a special kind of public-key encryption where some al-
gebraic manipulations on plaintext numbers can be realized in the encrypted domain.
Earlier homomorphic encryption such as RSA [112], ElGamal [50], and Paillier [104]
are only partially homomorphic. Fully homomorphic encryption or FHE was proposed
in [57] but remained highly complex and impractical for realistic computations [92].
Nevertheless, recent work [39, 23] has demonstrated efficient implementations of small
circuits using the so-called somewhat homomorphic encryption (SHE).
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Compared with the original plaintext computation circuit, the reliance on public-
key protocols like oblivious transfer and homomorphic encryption significantly in-
creases the size of the encrypted circuit. Instead of public-key based representations,
the protocol proposed by O. Goldreich, S. Micali, and A. Wigderson, or the GMW
protocol [62], and the protocol by M. Ben-Or, S. Goldwasser, and A. Wigderson, oe
the BGW protocol [12], use secret sharing schemes such as Shamir’s Secret Sharing
(SSS) scheme [119] to protect the secrecy of the operands. While GMW still re-
quires oblivious transfer to protect against malicious adversaries, the BGW protocol
is free of any expensive public-key operations and can use any prime field to achieve
information-theoretic security (ITS). The efficiency of the BGW protocol makes it
the basis of some ITS-MPC platforms including FairplayMP [11] and Sharemind [21],
the latter being used by the Estonian Government in studying the linkage of tax and
education records [20]. The focus of this dissertation is on building the application
framework for the BGW protocol, specifically with the SSS building block, for signal
processing.
The use of secure MPC in signal processing has a late start due to the sub-
stantial challenges in adapting the complex protocols to handle the high data rate
and real-time response demanded by typical signal processing applications. One of
the earliest projects, SPED (Signal Processing in the Encrypted Domain) and its
follow-on research were products of joint efforts between the applied cryptography
and signal processing communities, resulting in a number of homomorphic encryp-
tion based implementations of fundamental algorithms such as Fourier Transform
and filtering [41, 107, 18, 19]. Since then, there have been many other privacy en-
hanced applications from audio processing to biometric matching developed using
both GC and HE. Interested readers should consult survey papers in this area such
as [87, 52, 105]. Recently, efficient SSS-based protocols started to emerge in dif-
ferent signal-processing applications including medical data visualization [91], image
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denoising [116], video surveillance [126], and outsourced image enhancement [78].
2.2 Adversarial Model and Collusion Attacks in ITS-MPC Protocols
A key weakness of the BGW protocol is its susceptibility to collusion attacks. In SSS,
the secret can be reconstructed using shares from a subset of the computational par-
ties. The smallest size of such a subset is called the threshold of the SSS scheme and
it has been shown that the threshold cannot be smaller than half of the total number
of parties [12]. A collusion attack occurs when an adversary with malicious intent
controls the threshold or more parties in a joint computation. In the most general
case, when parties are connected by pairwise communication channels, collusion-free
protocols for computing non-trivial functions are impossible [3]. For our target ap-
plication of outsourced computation, we provide a detailed analysis of different col-
lusion attack scenarios in Section 4.2. Typical cryptographic approaches to counter
collusion include the use of centralized trusted mediators [2, 3] and complex crypto-
graphical constructions [12, 73]. These computationally intensive constructions are
incompatible with our efficiency goal in applying secure MPC techniques for high-rate
distributed signal processing applications.
Our focus on solving collusion attacks in outsourced computation stems from its
significant differences from other types of adversarial attacks. General consideration
of attacks on secure MPC protocols include two different aspects: 1) how parties are
identified and corrupted by an adversary, and 2) how corrupt parties behave under the
control of an adversary. For the first aspect, existing classifications typically focus on
whether an honest party becomes corrupted during the course of the computation [67].
For collusion attacks, this question is less important than how an honest party is
corrupted by an adversary to collude in stealing a secret - is it due to information
received in-band as part of the defined protocol or out-of-band through side channels?
The first kind is termed a local adversary attack as it is based on local information
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anticipated by the protocol. The local adversarial model has been used to model
collusion attacks before [24] and will be assumed in our protocol design.
As for the second question, adversarial behaviors are typically classified into semi-
honest and malicious. Semi-honest refers to behaviors that do not deviate from the
protocols but attempts to extract useful information from received data. The SSS
protocols described in Section 4.1 are secure under a semi-honest model. The semi-
honest model is quite limited in practice - it certainly cannot capture an attempt of a
corrupted party to persuade others to collude. The other end of the spectrum is the
malicious model which puts no restriction on the behaviors of a corrupted party, which
can disrupt and terminate the protocol at any time. Classical feasibility results have
already demonstrated that IT security can be achieved by an addition of a broadcast
channel and the use of verifiable secret sharing [109]. These additions, however,
significantly limit their applications due to a much higher computation complexity.
More importantly, the malicious model does not model colluding activities ad-
equately. First, in the presence of side channels, collusion can occur entirely out-
of-band and it is impossible to counter using only protocol design. Second, it does
not address the dynamic nature of collusion in which an honest participant agrees or
refuses to collude. Assuming that there is a rational being behind each participant,
there must be an external reason behind this decision such as a higher reward or a
non-negligible probability of getting caught. Such behaviors can be modeled with a
covert adversarial model in which a malicious attack can be deterred if the adversary
can be caught with high probability [8]. Many work have used this security notion
to design protocols that are more practical and efficient than those based on the no-
tion of malicious adversary. They achieve computational security using the building
blocks of oblivious transfer and homomorphic encryption [96, 7]. In [37], the authors
showed a general procedure to compile a protocol robust against the passive adver-
sary into a protocol against the covert adversary with cheating behavior being caught
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at a probability of 1
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or higher. Their benchmark on an AES cipher demonstrated a
significant performance enhancement over the baseline protocol that is secure against
the malicious adversary [38].
2.3 Game-Theoretic Analysis for Secure MPC
More fundamental to the protocol design is to address the rationality behind adversar-
ial behaviors. The use of game theory nicely captures the rationality of adversaries in
many commercial, political, and social settings: weighing the gain of cheating against
the risk and loss of being caught [66, 120]. The seminal work on rational secret sharing
and secure MPC by Halpern and Teague first took into account the rational decision
making process of the participants [65]. Since then, there has been several work focus-
ing on various aspects of rational secure MPC including mixed-behavior models [88],
rational ITS-MPC over broadcast channels [76], and computationally efficient rational
secret sharing [53]. Other work attempts to recast the secure MPC problem from a
game-theoretic perspective. In [6], the authors investigated two-party computation in
the context of a fail-stop game and extended the notions of privacy, correctness, and
fairness through equilibrium definitions from game theory. Recently, rational secret
sharing has also been extended to incorporate perfect Bayesian equilibrium to model
imperfect designs [131].
However, the problem addressed by the work[6, 131] is different from ours. They
provide solutions on how to encourage all agents to honestly carry out the computa-
tion so that the agents themselves can benefit from knowing the final answers. Such
formulation is not suitable for the computation outsourcing scenarios that we are
addressing. For outsourcing, the computational agents have no stake on the actual
secrets as they are simply carrying out a pre-defined computation in exchange for
some kind of reward. Also, the active involvement of an agent in a collusion at-
tack does not necessarily disrupt the computational process and the customers can
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still obtain the correct final results. As a result, our work primarily focuses on the
mechanism designed to cope with the heterogeneous nature of the games involving
both customers and computational agents as well as imperfect knowledge behind their
utility functions.
2.4 Secret Sharing Schemes
A secret sharing scheme serves as a procedure that involves two types of roles: the
secret owner and the share holding parties. The secret owner acts as a dealer to dis-
tribute shares to parties so that only authorized subsets of parties can reconstruct the
secret. Secret sharing schemes are important building blocks in cryptography and they
are used in many secure protocols. They have found a broad range of important ap-
plications. For example, general protocol for multi-party computation [14], Byzantine
agreement [109], threshold cryptography [56, 74], access control [93], attribute-based
encryption [63], and generalized oblivious transfer [71, 124].
Here we briefly review some of the most interesting constructions of secret sharing
schemes that are linear, that is, the distribution scheme is a linear mapping. We are
most interested in Shamir’s Secret Sharing (SSS), which is the building block for the
system proposed in this dissertation. It enjoys the property of homomorphism – that
addition and multiplication can be carried out directly on the shares [16]. SSS belongs
to the category of threshold secret sharing schemes, where the authorized sets, or the
access structure, are all sets whose size is bigger than some threshold. A (t, n) SSS has
the threshold being t and there are a total of n parties. Both t and n are integers and
1 ≤ t ≤ n. The access structure can be defined as At = {B ⊆ {p1, ..., pn} : |B| ≥ t},
where pi, i ∈ {1, ..., n} is the i−th party. The secret is hidden as the constant term
of a polynomial with random coefficients chosen by the secret owner. The shares are
evaluated at different points of the polynomial. A detailed review and discussion of
SSS can be found in Section 3.1. Benaloh and Rudich constructed a secret-sharing
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scheme that has its access structure corresponding to edges of a complete undirected
graph with m vertices v1, ..., vm. A secret bit k is shared into (m − 2) bits. Each
of the (m − 2) parties will have a bit calculated based on the generated bits [10].
Ito et al. defined secret sharing schemes for general access structures. They showed
the construction of such schemes for every monotone access structure. Let A be any
monotone access structure. The secret owner shares the secret independently for each
authorized set B ∈ A [72]. Generalizing the construction of [72], Benaloh and Leichter
proposed a construction of secret-sharing schemes for any monotone formulae access
structure. The length of the shares becomes exponential in the number of parties [15].
There is another category of secret sharing used for visual cryptography. It allows
secret visual information to be embedded and encrypted in a cover image such that a
well defined subset of the shared cover image could be overlapped to reconstruct the
secret visual information [30].
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Chapter 3 Encrypted Domain Signal Processing
In this chapter, we extend the basic homomorphic properties of Shamir’s sharing
scheme to handle common signal processing operations such as filtering and thresh-
olding. Based on these building blocks, we design an information-theoretically secure
protocol for distributed wavelet denoising. The operational setting of the protocol
described in Section 1.1 is repeated here as follows: a user U has an image which
he/she wants to keep private but requires denoising. A software provider called V
the Vendor holds a proprietary wavelet filter and a denoising threshold. After de-
composing their secret data into random shares, the shares are transmitted to three
computing parties in a network which provides point-to-point secure communication.
We assume that all three parties do not collude on their shares, and we will demon-
strate that the received data contain no information about the image nor the filter.
Once the computation is complete, the resulting shares are transmitted back to the
user to reassemble the denoised image. The key contributions of our work include the
development of information-theoretic secure signal processing building blocks with
secret shares and the demonstration of a realistic image processing algorithm using
the proposed framework. The organization of the Chapter is as follows: Section 3.1
reviews the Shamir’s secret sharing scheme and defines notations used in the rest
of the chapter. Section 3.2 shows how fundamental operations for signal processing
can be implemented with secret sharing. Section 3.3 describes our secure image de-
noising protocol and analyzes its complexity. We provide implementation details and
experimental results in Section 3.4, and conclude the chapter in Section 3.5.
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3.1 Shamir’s Secret Sharing
Let x be a number in a prime field Fm with m prime. Let n be the number of
parties and t, called the threshold, be a positive integer between 1 and n. A (t, n)
secret-sharing scheme of a secret number x produces n shares [x]ti, i = 1, 2, . . . , n such
that any group of t or more shares can be used to reconstruct x. Any group of less
than t shares, however, provides no information about x. Shamir’s secret sharing
scheme hides the secret as the constant term of a random degree (t− 1) polynomial.
The polynomial coefficients αj’s are uniformly random numbers selected by the secret
owner. The secret owner generates the ith share by evaluating the polynomial at a
public constant ki which usually is agreed to be the identity number of the i
th party:
[x]ti ,
t−1∑
j=1
αjk
j
i + x mod m. (3.1)
The fact that αj’s are uniformly random in a prime field implies that the shares must
also be uniformly random, thereby providing no information about x. Given at least
t shares, the secret number x can be reconstructed with Lagrange interpolation
x =
∑
i∈K
γi[x]
t
i mod m (3.2)
where γi ,
∏
j∈K,j 6=i
−kj
ki−kj and K is any subset of {1, . . . , n} with at least t elements.
Let x, y ∈ Fm be secret numbers and a, b ∈ Fm be constants. The following
properties of Shamir’s scheme are well known [16]:
(P1) [x+ a mod m]ti = [x]
t
i + a mod m
(P2) [ax mod m]ti = a[x]
t
i mod m
(P3) [x+ y mod m]
max(s,t)
i = [x]
s
i + [y]
t
i mod m
(P4) [xy mod m]
(s+t)−1
i = [x]
s
i [y]
t
i mod m
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(P5) Assume x, y ∈ {0, 1} and ⊕ denotes xor.
[x⊕ y](s+t)−1i = [x]si + [y]ti − 2[x]si [y]ti mod m
(P6) [x]ti =
∑n
j=1 γj[[x]
(s+t)−1
j ]
t
i mod m
P1 through P5 form the foundation of computation in secret shares – they show
that performing certain operations on each share of secret numbers is equivalent to
applying those operations first on the secret numbers and then creating the shares.
These operations include addition and multiplication with constants, with other se-
cret numbers, and exclusive-or on secret bits. These operations are universal in the
sense that any computation on a digital computer can be composed by successive
applications of these fundamental operations. Since the original shares do not reveal
any information about the secret numbers, no successive operations on the shares can
gain further knowledge. At the end of the operations, the secret owner can collect
enough shares to reveal the result.
There are however hidden communication cost associated with some of these op-
erations. Multiplication and exclusive-or operations (P4 and P5) produce results in
a sharing scheme with a higher threshold (s + t) − 2, where s and t are the original
thresholds of the two secret operands. Repeated applications of such operations will
eventually arrive at a threshold larger than the number of parties n and the final result
cannot be reconstructed even if all the shares are available. We can solve this prob-
lem by renormalizing the threshold using P6: each party further breaks his/her share
into separate shares and sends a share to its corresponding party. The final share
at each party is computed by a weighted summation of these newly received shares
from other parties. Since each party receives only one share from any other party, no
secret information is leaked. This threshold reduction requires n(n− 1) logm bits to
be exchanged among the n parties. Denote computing parties as Pk for k = 1, ..., n.
To highlight the communication between two computing parties Pi and Pj, we use
the arrow notation “−→”:
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(P6’) Pj : [[expr(x)]
q
j ]
t
i −→ Pi : [x]ti for i 6= j
The expr(·) operator in P6’ can include a composition of different operations which
increase the threshold to be q > t that may result in one or more steps of renormaliza-
tion. After those steps of renormalization, the new share will again has the threshold
to be t.
An obvious omission from the above properties is division between two secret
numbers. To compute xy−1 mod m, y−1 must exist in Fm. We denote the inverse
operation as follows:
(P7) INVERSE ([y]ti all i) −→ Pi : ([y−1]ti)
INVERSE can be implemented by repeated multiplications according to the Carmichael’s
theorem [113]: y−1 = yλ(m)−1 mod m, where λ(m) is the (reduced) totient function.
Notice that with this equation, the inverse of 0 is defined and is equal to 0. For prime
m, λ(m) = m − 1. For large λ(m) − 1, the inverse operation is expensive as every
multiplication requires a renormalization step. To reduce the number of multiplica-
tions, we can first express λ(m)− 1 as a sum of powers of two, say λ(m)− 1 = 1011
base 2 which implies yλ(m)−1 = y4y2y. We can then recursively compute [y2]ti and
[y4]ti before multiplying them together to get the final answer. The communication
complexity will be O(log λ(m)) rather than O(λ(m)) in the sequential multiplication.
3.2 Signal Processing on Random Shares
Armed with the basic properties, many commonly used signal processing operations
can be implemented. For example, in a linear convolution operation, two parties
holding a secret signal x(t) and a filter h(t) can create n shares independently and
distribute them to n parties to perform a privacy-protected linear filtering:[∑
τ
x(t− τ)h(τ)
]2t−1
i
=
∑
τ
[x(t− τ)]ti[h(τ)]ti (3.3)
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In this section, we survey a set of state-of-art arithmetic operations implemented
in the secret sharing domain. These protocols can form the toolbox for privacy
protecting signal processing tasks. These protocols are designed for integer and fixed
point numbers. They achieve perfect privacy or statistical privacy.
With the domain and range in a prime field Zm, a function can be represented
in the form of an arithmetic circuit or in the form of a Boolean circuit. While the
basic addition and multiplication of shares can be computed in an arithmetic circuit,
non-linear operations such as equality test and comparison are more easily done in
the Boolean circuit. Thus a first step to process shares will be to decompose them
into bit representations. To simplify our notation for a share, we drop the subscripts
i and t which stand for the ith party and the threshold. Suppose a secret x has l bits.
The share of x is denoted by [x]. The bitwise sharing of x is denoted as [x]B. The goal
is to get [xl−1], ..., [x0] which satisfies x =
∑l−1
i=0 2
ixi, i.e. [x]B = [xl−1], ..., [x0]. Denote
a random number from Zm as r. We use several primitive protocols to simplify
our descriptions. They are Rand(Zm) which generates a random element from the
prime field Zm, Output([x]) which reveals the number x from its shares [x], and
[x < y?1 : 0]← Bitlt([x]B, [y]B) which carries out bit-wise comparison of x and y in
shares and outputs 1 if x < y, otherwise 0 [36].
Bit Decomposition
Damg˚ard et al. proposed bit decomposition with unconditional security with con-
stant rounds [36]. Nishide and Ohta improved upon Damg˚ard’s work to achieve less
complexity [99]. Their bit decomposition protocol is summarized in Protocol 1.
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Require: [x]
Ensure: [x]B
1. [r]B ← Rand(Zm)
2. [r]← [r]B
3. [c] = [x]− [r]
4. c← Output([c]). If c = 0 done, because [r]B = [x]B by a coincidence.
5. If c 6= 0, compute [q] = [m ≤ r + c]← 1− Bitlt([r]B, [m− c]B)
6. Compute di for i = 0, ..., l−1 that satisfies 2l+c−m =
∑l−1
i=0 2
idi, and compute
fi for i = 0, ..., l − 1 that satisfies c =
∑l−1
i=0 2
ifi.
7. Compute [gi] = (di − fi)[q] + fi for i = 0, ..., l − 1, i.e. [g]B.
8. Compute [h]B = [r]B + [g]B.
9. Discard [hl] from [h]B to obtain [x]B.
Protocol 1: DECOMPOSITION [x]→ [x]B
Truncation
The truncation operation is a core component in the fixed-point arithmetic. Denote
signed integers as Z〈k〉 = {x¯ ∈ Z|−2k−1 ≤ x¯ ≤ 2k−1−1}. Signed integers are encoded
in the prime field Zm by x = x mod m,m > 2k where m is a prime. The truncation
protocol computes d¯ = bx¯/2s + uc, where x¯ ∈ Z〈k〉 and s ∈ [1, ..., k − 1]. The bit u
depends on the rounding method. Catrina and Hoogh proposed a truncation protocol
that achieves statistical privacy [27]. Their protocol is summarized in Protocol 2.
Equality Test
Given two secret numbers x, y ∈ Zm, the equality test protocol computes [(x ==
y?1 : 0)]. The problem of deciding whether x = y is equivalent to whether x− y = 0.
Let a = x− y, and c = a+ r where r is a random number. Note that c = r if a = 0.
Nishide and Ohta proposed an equality test protocol without decomposing the secret
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Require: [x], k, s
Ensure: [d]
1. [r′′]← Rand(Z〈k〉), [r′]← Rand(Z〈k〉)
2. [r′]B ← Decomposition([r′])
3. c← Output(2k−1 + [x] + 2s[r′′] + [r′])
4. c′ ← c mod 2s
5. [d]← ([x]− c′ + [r′])(2−s mod m)
Protocol 2: TRUNCATION [d]← Trunc([x], k, s)
d into bits. Their protocol is summarized in Protocol 3.
Require: [x], [y]
Ensure: [w] = [(x == y)?1 : 0]
1. [r]B ← Rand(Zm)
2. [r]← [r]B
3. [a] = [x− y], [c] = [a] + [r]
4. c← Output([c])
5. Represent c bitwise as cl−1, ..., c0, and denote new variable [c′i] for i = 0, ..., l−1.
If ci = 1, [c
′
i] = [ri].
Else if ci = 0, [c
′
i] = 1− [ri]. Note that c′i = 1 iff ci = ri.
6. [w] =
∧l−1
i=0[c
′
i].
Protocol 3: EQUALITY-TEST [w]← EqualityTest([x], [y])
Interval Test
The interval test protocol is to decide whether a secret element x ∈ Zm is within the
interval [c1, c2] or not, where public constants c1, c2 ∈ Zm and c1 < c2. Nishide and
Ohta proposed an interval testing protocol without decomposing the secret x into
bits. Their protocol is summarized in Protocol 4.
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Require: [x], c1, c2
Ensure: [d] = [([c1 < x < c2])?1 : 0]
1. [r]B ← Rand(Zm)
2. [r]← [r]B
3. [c] = [a] + [r]
4. c← Output([c])
5. If c1 < c < c2 is not true,
If c2 ≤ c,
[d1] = Bitlt([c− c2]B, [r]B), [d2] = Bitlt([c− c1]B, [r]B),
[d] = [d1]× [d2].
If c ≤ c1,
[d1] = Bitlt([c+m− c2]B, [r]B), [d2] = Bitlt([c+m− c1]B, [r]B),
[d] = [d1]× [d2].
6. If c1 < c < c2 is not true,
[d1] = Bitlt([c− c1 − 1]B, [r]B), [d2] = Bitlt([c+m− c2 + 1]B, [r]B),
[d3] = [d1]× [d2],
[d] = 1− [d3].
Protocol 4: INTERVAL-TEST [d]← IntervalTest([x], c1, c2)
Exponentiation
Given a public constant a ∈ Zm and the secret x ∈ Z, the secure MPC protocol
of exponentiation calculates xa mod m ∈ Zm. Damg˚ard et al. proposed a private
exponentiation protocol with perfect privacy summarized as follows in Protocol 5 [36].
Comparison
Comparison is central to non-linear signal processing. To implement comparison, we
first need to clarify its semantics in the prime field Fm. We allow negative secret
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Require: [x], a
Ensure: [xa]
1. [r]← Rand(Zm), compute [ra].
2. Compute [xr], and reveal xr ← Output([xr]).
3. Compute y = (xr)a = xara.
4. [xa] = y[r−a] = y[(ra)−1].
Protocol 5: EXPONENTIATION Exp([x], a)
number −x to be represented by m − x in Fm. Thus, a comparison of x > 0 is
equivalent to x mod m < dm/2e. Second, we need to select m to be at least twice
as big as the dynamic range of any intermediate and final values in the target signal
processing algorithm. This is necessary to ensure that we can represent both xmax −
xmin and xmin−xmax in Fm where xmax and xmin are the largest and smallest numbers.
To handle the non-linear nature of comparison, we rely on the radix-2 representations
of the numbers. Let us start with a simpler version of comparison that compares two
secret numbers v and w in plaintext stored at two different parties. To simplify the
description of the protocol, we assume a three-party computation, i.e. n = 3 and
t = 2. The notation of this comparison protocol is as follows:
(P8) COMPARE2 (v at P1, w at P2) −→ Pi : [v > w]2i
where the binary predicate v > w is 1 if true and 0 if false. Notice the binary output
is represented in F5, which is the smallest prime field one can use to represent a secret
among three parties. We use such a small prime field to minimize the communication
overhead. The details of the protocol are given in Protocol 6 [117].
Correctness: Steps 1 and 2 create shares for each bit in v and w. Step 3 computes
the expression (v0 − w0 + 1), which is 2 if v0 > w0, 0 if v0 < w0, and 1 otherwise.
For the subsequent bits, bj at step 4 is 1 until the corresponding bits from v and w
begin to differ, and all the subsequent bj’s will be 0. (vj −wj + 2− bj) will be 1 until
28
Require: v at P1, w at P2, and [b0]
2
i , [1]2i
Ensure: [c]2i at party Pi for i = 1, 2, 3 where c , (v > w).
1. P1,2 : v , v0 . . . vl−1 base 2, w , w0 . . . wl−1 base 2
2. P1,2 : [vj]
2
i , [wj]
2
i −→ Pi for j = 0, . . . , l − 1.
3. Pi : [c]
2
i , [v0 − w0 + 1]2i
4. for k = 1 to 3 and j = 1 to l − 1
Pk : [[bj−1(1− vj−1 ⊕ wj−1)]3k]2i −→ Pi : [bj]2i
Pk : [[c(vj − wj + 2− bj)]3k]2i −→ Pi : [c]2i
5. Pk : [[c
4]k]
2
i −→ Pi : [c]2i
Protocol 6: COMPARE2(v, w)
the bits start to differ – it will be 0 if v < w and 2 if w > v. This leads to c = 0
if v < w. The subsequent steps inside the loop will not produce another 0 because
bj = 0 and vj − wj + 2− bj can only be 1 or 3. As such, c is 0 if and only if v < w.
At step 5, we invoke the Carmichael’s theorem to ensure that the output can only be
0 or 1. Security & Complexity: Communications occur at steps 2, 4, and 5. Step 2 is
the initial distribution of shares and the rest are all renormalization steps. As such,
none of them provide any additional information. The protocol is thus secure. The
communication complexity of COMPARE2 is (20l − 6) log 5 bits.
COMPARE2 requires the plaintext of the secret numbers while a proper COM-
PARE function should assume that each party has access to only a share of the secret
numbers. We will take the difference between the two secret numbers as [x]ti and
develop the COMPARE function to determine if x < dm/2e as follows:
(P9) COMPARE ([x]2i all i) −→ Pi : [x < dm/2e]ti
Correctness: Steps 1 through 4 creates plaintext numbers v and w at party 2 and 3
to represent x using (3.2) such that
x = (v mod m+ w mod m) mod m.
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Require: [x]2i at party Pi for i = 1, 2, 3
Ensure: [d]2i at party Pi for i = 1, 2, 3 where d , (x < dm/2e).
1. P1 : a random r −→ P2.
2. P1 : u , γ1[x]21 − r −→ P3.
3. P2 : v , γ2[x]22 + r
4. P3 : w , γ3[x]23 + u
5. COMPARE2(m− v, bm/2c+ w) −→ [a]2i
6. COMPARE2(v,m− w) −→ [b]2i
7. COMPARE2(m+ dm/2e − v, w) −→ [c]2i
8. Pk : [[a⊕ (bc)]k]2i −→ Pi : [d]2i
Protocol 7: COMPARE
(
[x]ti for i = 1, 2, 3
)
If x < dm/2e, then one of the following two statements must hold:
v mod m+ w mod m < dm/2e (3.4)
m ≤ v mod m+ w mod m < m+ dm/2e (3.5)
Step 5 checks the inequality in (3.4), and steps 6 and 7 check (3.5). Since the two
steps cannot both return 1, the output can be computed using an exclusive-or as in
step 8. Security & Complexity: Since r is random, party 2 and 3 cannot gain any
knowledge about the original share of party 1. The security of the rest of the protocol
is guaranteed by that of COMPARE2. The communication complexity of COMPARE
is 2l + (60l − 6) log 5 bits.
3.3 Privacy-Protected Image Denoising
This section describes the adaptation of wavelet denoising into secret shares. As
described in Section 1.1, two customers, User U and a software provider Vendor
V come to a third party computing platform for a joint task. U owns a secret
image and V owns the filters and the denoising parameters. All secret data will be
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decomposed into random shares which are distributed to three non-colluding semi-
honest computational parties to execute the algorithm.
Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT)
DWT is the first step of many important image processing functions including de-
noising, compression, and enhancement. The most common implementation of DWT
is via a dyadic tree, shown in Figure 3.1 (a). Such an implementation involves the
repeated application of linear filtering. In order to preserve the homomorphism, a
renormalization step needs to be applied after each level of filtering. Let’s consider
the communication complexity of implementing a 2-level 2D-DWT. Suppose the size
of the initial secret share is l bits per pixel for the image. We ignore the contribu-
tions from the filters which are small compared with the image. Initial dissemination
creates 3l bits per pixel. After horizontal filtering, the first renormalization gener-
ates an additional 6l bits per pixel. As the second level of DWT applies only to the
lowest frequency subband, it generates an addition 6 · l
4
= 3l
2
bits per pixel for each
of the vertical and horizontal filtering. The overall communication overhead is thus
3l + 6l + 3l = 12l bits per pixel. Alternatively, we can flatten the dyadic tree into
a filter bank of seven subband filters as shown in Figure 3.1 (b). The filter bank
itself can be computed by passing a single impulse as an input signal to the dyadic
DWT. As the input has only 1 pixel, the communication overhead is negligible. The
subsequent processing on the random shares of the image does not need any commu-
nication beyond the initial distribution of the shares, which amount to only 3l bits
per pixel or 1
4
of that required by a dyadic tree implementation. The computation
complexity increases slightly due to the use of 2-D filters.
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Figure 3.1: Two implementations of DWT: (a) via a dyadic tree, (b) the flattened version of (a)
Wavelet shrinkage
In this section, we describe our implementation of a popular wavelet shrinkage denois-
ing technique called BayesShrink [29]. While keeping the wavelet coefficients from the
lowest frequency subband yL intact, coefficients from the high frequency subbands yH
are shrunk by a threshold λ if their absolute values are bigger than λ or set to zero if
smaller. In the share domain, this shrinkage function can be implemented with the
COMPARE protocol from Section 3.2:
δλ(yH(i)) , COMPARE(yH(i), λ)(yH(i)− λ) +
COMPARE(−λ, yH(i))(yH(i) + λ) (3.6)
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There are many different approaches to determine λ and we use λ = σ2y/σw, where
σy is the estimated noise variance of the image:
σy =
∑N
i=1 |yHH(i)|
0.6745N
(3.7)
with yHH denoting the highest diagonal frequency subband andN its size. σw estimate
the noise variance of the particular subband to be denoised:
σw =
[
max
(
1
Nw
Nw∑
i=1
yw(i)
2 − σ2y, 0
)]1/2
(3.8)
with yw denoting the subband and Nw denoting the number of coefficients in yw. This
implementation is a slight variation of that described in [29].
While it is possible to implement these equations entirely in the secret share
domain, the protocol will reveal the threshold calculation process – a key step which
the software provider may want to keep as a secret. To keep this step proprietary,
we compute subband statistics including
∑
i |yHH(i)| and
∑
i yw(i)
2 in shares but
reconstruct the final statistics into plaintext for the software provider to determine λ.
Such statistics reveal little information about the details of the image but enable the
software provider the flexibility in determining the threshold in private. Finally, the
provider will create 3 shares of λ and send them back to the computational agents to
complete the shrinkage from Equation (3.6). A final remark about the calculations
of the two subband statistics: to prevent possible overflow, we use multiple words to
keep track of overflow digits. For example, if we want to hold the running sum in two
words S0 and S1, we will first compute the carry bit C = COMPARE(S0, Rmax − x)
where Rmax is the range for one word and x < Rmax is the next number to be added.
Then, we store the results in two words: S1 , S1 + C and S0 , S0 − CRmax + x.
3.4 System Implementation and Experiments
We implement our protocols in MATLAB on five different machines on the same
LAN. Machines representing the user and the filter owner carry out the simple tasks
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generating shares and assembling the final results. The bulk of the computation are
done at the three machines corresponding to the computational agents. They all run
windows 7 with 4 GB RAM on Intel Core 2 Quad CPU Q9650 @ 3 GHz. For the
wavelet filters, we use the rationalized version of the 9/7 biorthogonal pair of Co-
hen, Daubechies, and Feauveau [125]. We chose the modulus m to be the prime just
greater than 231 and evaluate the shares at ki = 1, 2, and 3. Table 3.1 provides time
measurements including data transmission time of the proposed algorithms using a
9/7 wavelet filter on a 128 × 128 image. RENORMALIZATION is essentially the
Table 3.1: Time measurements of different protocols
Algorithm Time (per pixel)
SHARE CREATION 3.600 us
RENORMALIZATION 5.587 us
COMPARE2 1.126 ms
COMPARE 3.425 ms
1-Level DENOISING 30.406 ms
same as SHARE CREATION plus network time in distributing shares. Their differ-
ence highlights the fact that a significant portion of time is devoted for networking.
COMPARE2 represents a significant increase in complexity compared with the more
elementary functions. Even though we execute each step of our protocol over the
entire image so that we can accumulate enough information for better network uti-
lization, the repeated usage of renormalization in COMPARE2 significantly increases
the time spent on data transmission. For a 1-level denoising scheme, roughly 10
COMPARE operations are used per pixel – two are for shrinkage while the remaining
eight are for statistics computation.
3.5 Summary
In this chapter, we have presented information-theoretic secure protocols for privacy-
protected signal processing. Using the classical Shamir’s secret sharing scheme, we
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have developed algorithms to handle various fundamental signal processing opera-
tions. These operations are used to build a realistic wavelet denoising system over
three non-colluding computing agents and performance numbers are measured. Other
signal processing applications on secret shares and network protocols to deter collu-
sion in a distributed environment will be described in details in the remaining of this
dissertation.
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Chapter 4 Collusion Attacks in the Outsourced Computing
In this chapter, we begin with an overview of our computing framework. We then
provide a background review on game theoretic mechanisms in Section 4.1 which is
needed for the remainder of the dissertation. Section 4.2 presents our collusion attack
model.
4.1 Background
Outsource Computation
Our computing framework is composed of two types of participants: the computing
platform agents and the platform customers, i.e. the secret-data owners. Denote any
pair of platform customers as U and V who want to cooperate in a joint computation.
We focus our discussions on two parties but the scheme is general enough for arbitrary
number of parties. U and V do not trust each other with their secret data and they
do not possess the necessary resources for the computation. As such, they outsource
their computation to the computing platform by means of the SSS protocols.
At the heart of any SSS protocols is the assumption of the availability of multiple
computing agents. Compared with other encrypted-domain techniques, SSS is par-
ticularly suitable for protecting privacy in distributed signal processing because it is
information-theoretic secure and does not require computation in a large prime field.
We denote a computing agent in the computing platform as Ai where i ∈ {1, 2, . . .}.
To coordinate different agents, we assume that there is a coordinator C who is re-
sponsible for keeping records of the IDs of participants but does not handle any actual
secret data. This architecture is illustrated in Figure 4.1. Note that U and V do not
trust Ai’s and C with their data either. The agents Ais are localized covert adver-
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saries. Details of the adversarial model for Ai’s and C will be discussed in Section
4.2.
Figure 4.1: Outsourced Computation Framework
Despite its simplicity, this computational framework is an abstraction of many
practical scenarios. For example, in the context of cloud computing, Ai provides
platform as a service (PaaS) while U can be a user with sensitive data and V is a
proprietary software vendor providing software as a service (SaaS) [128]. Another
example is privacy-preserving data mining in which a data mining algorithm running
at Ai’s are applied on a large dataset comprising of private data from both U and
V [81]. It is also important to note that our emphasis is on protecting privacy of
data, rather than the programming instructions. In general, we assume that U and
V are fully aware of the intention and flow of the program as they need to prepare
their data in the appropriate form. The actual program is carried out at each of the
agents Ai. However, Ai has access only to encrypted data so the actual program it is
executing could be obfuscated to hide data communication patterns that might reveal
important information about the data. More discussions on this issue can be found
in Section 4.2.
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Renormalization for Multiplication in Shamir’s Secret Sharing
Shamir’s Secret Sharing (SSS) protects privacy by decomposing a secret into input
shares. It is information theoretic secure: an adversary has no knowledge of the secret
at all regardless of its computing power if the number of input shares it obtained does
not satisfy the pre-defined access structure of the underlying sharing scheme [35]. For
the (t, n)-SSS scheme where n is the number of computing agents and t < n is a
designed parameter called threshold, the access structure is for any entity holding at
least t shares. The details of the SSS has been review in Section 3.1.
Assume that there are n computing agents and U has a private input x from a
prime field Fm, where m is a prime number. U hides x as the constant term of a
random (t − 1)-degree polynomial, and generates n shares, [x]ti for i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
The second party, V , follows the same procedure in using a random (t − 1)-degree
polynomial of his/her choice to break his/her secret number y ∈ Fm into shares [y]ti
for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. The i-th shares of both x and y are sent to agent i for processing.
SSS is homomorphic in addition, scaling (by a known factor) and multiplication,
which are universal in building any arithmetic circuit [12]. For multiplication of
shares, the resulting polynomial has a higher degree of 2t− 2:
[xy mod m]2t−1i = [x]
t
i[y]
t
i mod m. (4.1)
Notice that the degree of the product polynomial increases to 2t − 2. Thus, the
threshold for reconstruction will also increase to 2t−1, requiring almost twice as many
shares, or equivalently agents, to reconstruct the product. There are two solutions to
this problem: the first solution is to increase the number of parties n to guarantee
that n is large enough to accommodate all multiplication operations. The second
solution is to apply a “renormalization” procedure to reduce the threshold back to
t [16]: each agent breaks its product share into n separate shares, and sends one
share to each of the corresponding agents. The final share at each agent is computed
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as a weighted summation of these newly received shares from other agents as shown
below:
[xy mod m]ti =
n∑
j=1
γj[[xy mod m]
2t−1
j ]
t
i mod m. (4.2)
It can be shown that the renormalization process is information-theoretic secure [16].
The first approach is less flexible because a large n must be used throughout the
entire computation process. In fact, it can be shown that the renormalization is more
scalable than adding more agents. Suppose there are η multiplications in a procedure
with shares generated at the original threshold t. The first solution will require at least
η(t− 1) + 1 agents. All secret numbers used in the calculations must be decomposed
into η(t− 1) + 1 shares and the final reconstruction must require collection of all the
shares. Assuming a new secret number is used in each multiplication, there will be
η + 2 rounds of shares dissemination including the initial secret and final collection.
The total bandwidth required is proportional to (η + 2) · (η(t− 1) + 1) = O(η2).
For the second approach, the number of agents n is independent of the number of
multiplication operations and can be set to the smallest value of n = 2t− 1. For each
renormalization step, each agent needs to send shares to every other agent, resulting
in (2t − 1)(2t − 2) = 4t2 − 6t + 2 shares being exchanged. Taking into account the
share generation of all η+ 1 secret numbers, η− 1 renormalization steps and the final
reconstruction, the total bandwidth is proportional to (η+2)·(2t−1)+(η−1)·(4t2−6t+
2) = O(η). It is thus expected that the second approach is more scalable to complex
signal processing algorithms. With the use of renormalization, we concentrate our
discussions on the simplest access structure with t = 2 and n = 2t − 1 = 3 agents
which is adequate for any computation procedure. Nevertheless, all of our proposed
algorithms apply equally well to general access structures.
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Game Theory
Game theory provides a mathematical foundation to analyze situations where two
or more participants or players make rational decisions that influence one another’s
welfare. The interactions may include both conflict and cooperation. There are many
categories of games in the literature. In our work, we adopt strategic form games to
model collusion attacks as non-cooperative games. Specifically, we utilize the strategic
form games in the context of population evolution to demonstrate that the proposed
games indeed have stable solutions. Game-theoretic concepts used in our framework
are summarized below and we refer readers to the excellent coverage of the topics in
[136] and [94] for details.
Definition 4.1.1. A strategic form game Γ is defined as a tuple 〈N, (Si)i∈N , (ui)i∈N〉,
where N = {1, 2, ..., n} is a finite set of players, Si is the set containing all available
strategies of player i, and ui : S1× ...× Sn → R for i = 1, 2, ..., n are mappings called
the utility functions or payoff functions.
Then a game between two players could be described in a table where the entries
of the first column stand for the strategies of the row player and the entries of the
first row stand for the strategies of the column player. Each combination of a row
strategy and a column strategy determines a utility to a player.
In game theory, players are assumed to be interested in maximizing his/her utility.
A celebrated solution concept is the Nash Equilibrium. We describe the two-player
case here.
Definition 4.1.2. A Nash Equilibrium (NE) for two player games is a pair of strate-
gies (s∗1, s
∗
2) such that u1(s
∗
1, s
∗
2) ≥ u1(s1, s∗2),∀s1 ∈ S1 and u2(s∗1, s∗2) ≥ u2(s∗1, s2),∀s2 ∈
S2.
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Another solution concept is the Dominant Strategy Equilibrium (DSE). The num-
ber of players N could be bigger than 2. We denote the strategy of player i as si
and the strategy profile of i’s opponent players as si. We present the strong sense of
dominance here:
Definition 4.1.3. Given a game Γ = 〈N, (Si)i∈N , (ui)i∈N〉, a strategy si ∈ Si is said
to strongly dominate another strategy s′i ∈ Si if ui(si, s−i) > ui(s′i, s−i),∀s−i ∈ S−i
Definition 4.1.4. A strategy s∗i ∈ Si is said to be a strongly dominant strategy for
player i if it strongly dominates every other strategy si ∈ Si.
Definition 4.1.5. In a n-person game, a strategy profile (s∗1, ..., s
∗
n) is a strongly
dominant strategy equilibrium of the game Γ = 〈N, (Si)i∈N , (ui)i∈N〉 if s∗i is a strongly
dominant strategy for all i.
It is easy to see that any (strongly) DSE is also a NE but the converse is not true.
The conditions for DSE are very strong and many games do not even have a DSE.
On the other hand, NE always exists in a finite game [136]. In Section 5.1, we will
consider collusion and honesty as possible strategies in our secure MPC games, and
derive conditions under which honesty is part of these different solution concepts.
In a distributed systems, agents usually have additional private information that
affects their decision making. For example, in an auction, each bidder may have
his/her own private valuation of the item that is kept secret to themselves, but the
actual bid they submit could be different than their valuation. Similarly, in secure
MPC, each user may value their secrets differently. When players have their private
information about the game that other players do not know, the game can be analyzed
using Bayesian Game theory.
Definition 4.1.6. A Bayesian Game Γ is defined as a tuple
〈N, (Θi)i∈N , (Si)i∈N , (αi)i∈N , (ui)i∈N〉,
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where
• N = {1, 2, ..., n} is a finite set of players.
• Θi is the set of private information, or types, of player i where i ∈ N = {1, ..., n}.
Denote Θ = Θ1 × . . .×ΘN .
• Si is the strategy set of player i. Denote S = S1 × . . .× SN .
• The probability function αi specifies a probability distribution αi(.|θi) over the
set Θ−i. It represents the belief of player i on the types of other players, denoted
as Θ−i, if his/her own type is θi.
• ui : Θ × S → R for i = 1, 2, ..., n are utility functions.
The solution concepts of NE and DSE can be easily extended to Bayesian games [94].
The computation of Bayesian NE depends on the knowledge of the prior belief func-
tions αi, which can be difficult to obtain in many practical applications. As such, it
is generally preferable to use DSE to analyze Bayesian games as their analysis does
not require the belief functions [129]. We will follow this practice in our work by first
using NE to analyze the simpler case where all players have the same privacy prefer-
ence, and then switching to DSE when we use Bayesian games to analyze uncertainty
in privacy preference.
To study large distributed systems, we need to map game theoretic analysis to
a population of similar players playing the same strategic form game with different
strategies over a period of time. The framework to analyze such games is called the
Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT). EGT does not assume the players to be hyper-
rational as in the case of traditional GT. Instead, the players can learn from their
previous payoffs and update their strategies accordingly. Besides its origin in modeling
biological processes [136], EGT is also suitable to analyze situations where many
autonomous agents with conflicting interests interact with each others in a distributed
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system to achieve specific goals. For example, EGT has been used to model P2P
streaming [31], wireless network selection [100], spectrum sharing [101], and social
networks [102]. In this dissertation, we use EGT in Section 7.2 to demonstrate the
effectiveness of our countermeasures while treating collusion as a strategic form game.
The alternative to NE in EGT is the possible existence of an evolutionary end-
point of adopting a specific strategy s∗, called the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS).
Given a 2-player strategic form game, suppose the game is played between any pair of
players from a population. We define a population profile x such that x(s) for s ∈ S
denotes the fraction of the population playing s. To consider if a particular strategy
s∗ is evolutionary stable, we specialize the notation xε to mean x(s∗) = 1 − ε and∑
s 6=s∗ x(s) = ε for ε ∈ [0, 1]. The second term is typically referred to as the mutant
population. Then, we have the following definition of ESS:
Definition 4.1.7. The strategy s∗ is an evolutionary stable strategy or ESS if there
exists an ε such that for every 0 < ε < ε and u(s∗,xε) > u(s,xε),∀s ∈ S \ {s∗} where
u(s,x) =
∑
s′∈S x(s
′)u(s, s′).
In other words, u(s,xε) denotes the average payoff of a new player entering the
population playing strategy s against a random player from population profile xε.
As this new player is more likely to choose s∗, the mutant population will diminish,
further strengthening the condition in the definition. The population profile when
no further evolution occurs anymore is called evolutionary stable state. It is also
important to note that ESS is a stronger concept than NE. In fact, an ESS must also
be a NE but a NE is not necessarily evolutionary stable [94].
In addition to ESS, another core concept in EGT is the evolutionary game dynam-
ics. It describes how the population profile changes over time based on the fitness of
each strategy [69]. The most common approach to model the dynamics is through a
43
set of replicator equations for each strategy in the form of
d
dt
x(s) = x(s) ·
(
u(s,x)−
∑
s′∈S
x(s′)u(s′,x)
)
(4.3)
where x is the population profile. Equation (4.3) describes a simple exponential
growth model. This is generally applicable to autonomous agent systems where there
is inertia in staying with the same strategy and the rate of change of the population
using a particular strategy depends on the difference between the utility of that
strategy and the average utility. In Section 7.2, we will use replicator dynamics to
simulate our mechanisms to validate the theoretical analysis.
4.2 Collusion Attack Models
Unlike two-party garbled circuits and homomorphic encryption, SSS-based protocols
are prone to collusion attacks (CA). We now describe the different types of collusion
attacks that can occur under the SSS-based outsourced computation framework. We
will continue to use the same notations as defined in Sections 3.1 and 4.1.
A1: Side-channels among agents for collusion
If an adversary controls t or more computing agents involved in the computation, they
can exchange their secret shares freely through their pre-established side channels to
reconstruct the secret numbers x and y. As the communication through the side
channels is independent from the information exchanged within the protocol, such
attacks cannot be detected within the protocol and must be tackled at the architecture
level. One possible approach to deter such attacks is by obfuscating the computing
task to make it difficult for an adversary to identify the computing agents involved in a
specific task and determine their functions. A classical example is the aforementioned
online gambling – poker room companies assign players from certain countries to be
at different tables to reduce the possibility of pre-existing side channels [5]. The exact
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approach when applied in the context of distributed computation will depend on the
infrastructure behind the computing platform, P . We consider two scenarios:
(i) P2P: P is formed by amassing a large number of independent computing agents
on the internet that contribute their CPU cycles in exchange for small payments. To
deter an adversary from identifying the set of agents involved in a task, we can rely on
the coordinator C that randomly assigns agents to a task. C is assumed to be trusted
with keeping the mapping secret. Since C is not involved in the actual computation,
the additional measure required to secure C should not significantly affect the scala-
bility of the platform. Such a hybrid approach of mixing computation/communication
peers with coordinators is quite common among peer-to-peer systems [122]. The use
of anonymity network protocols such as Tor [43] can also prevent the formation of the
side channels and force the communication to the assigned communication channels.
(ii) Enterprise Cloud: P is centrally managed by an enterprise system. The solution
is to obfuscate the computation process so that different agents on the same cloud
would not be able to recognize that their processes originate from the same task.
All identifiable information, such as IP addresses of the user and vendor, must be
obfuscated while dummy instructions and data should be added to mask the traffic
pattern [9].
Nevertheless, these approaches on system architecture cannot provide any guar-
antee on preventing the formation of side channels. The detailed implementation
of these approaches are system oriented and beyond the scope of our work. In the
sequel, we will assume that no such side channels exist among agents and model the
adversaries as localized or restricted to the assigned communication channels [24].
A2: Collusion between agents and U or V
We will focus on the agents’ collusion with U , as the case for V is identical. As each
agent possesses secret shares from both U and V , it is possible for U to collude with t
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or more agents to reconstruct y from V . No changes in infrastructure can block such
an attack as it is necessary for U to communicate with the agents. Neither can the
collusion be detected from the communication between V and the agents. To deter
such an attack, we propose a retaliation mechanism such that a heavy penalty can
be levied on U if V can provide convincing evidence of the leakage of his/her secret
through U . In Section 5.1, we study the choice to collude or to stay honest under
retaliation as a game between U and V . We show that being honest is the solution,
provided that there exist effective tools to collect evidence of theft.
On the other hand, it is not always possible to collect any evidence or it may
be too costly to go through with the retaliation process. To cope with such an
“undetectable” theft, we observe that enough agents must be involved in a collusion
attack for it to be successful. Thus, collusion can be deterred by having undercover
police officers disguised as corrupted users/vendors in catching agents who are willing
to collude. In Section 6.1, we formulate such an interaction as an evolutionary game
and show that if there are enough police officers, being honest is indeed an NE for
the agents.
A3: Collusion attack by computing agents
The direct communication among agents is essential as it is needed in the renormal-
ization procedure and the reconstruction of necessary intermediate values in more
complicated protocols. On the other hand, it also opens doors for them to collude.
The difference between A1 and A3 is that the communication is localized in that
the coalition of agents in A3 forms after the random assignment of agents to U and
V . As such, it is possible for U and V to thwart this collusion by inspecting the
communication among agents. Note that the communications among agents consists
of random secret shares so it is challenging to identify if they actually contain sub-
liminal data for collusion. Also, uncontrolled examination by U (or V) may reveal
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information about the original secret data from other parties. In Section 5.1, we
suggest a censorship scheme in which U and V collect the data from each agent and
randomize them before sending them back to the agents. Subliminal communication
becomes impossible due to the injection of random noise known only to U and V.
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Chapter 5 Anti-collusion for Customers
In this section, we use game-theoretic techniques to model A2 collusion attacks as
described in Section 4.2, identify conditions and propose countermeasures to deter
such attacks. Collusion attacks A2 refer to the collusion formed between the agents
and either U or V to steal the other’s secret. In Section 5.1, we first study the strategy
of either U or V in participating in a collusion attack to steal the other’s secret as a
game called User-Vendor Game. Then, in Section 6.1, we will consider the influence
of the agents and propose countermeasures in a game called Customer-Agent Game.
5.1 User-Vendor Game
We assume that, before starting the joint computation, there exists a legally-binding
contract in place so that U and V both understand that they should not collude with
agents in stealing each other’s secrets. This contract would stipulate that if one party,
say V , finds out that U tried to steal V ’s secret, U would be liable to pay for the
damages based on charges brought by V . In retaliation, U could countercharge V
with similar accusations. The judgement in resolving such a conflict would need to
be carried out by proper authority, possibly after a long proceeding in evaluating the
legitimacy of evidence provided by both parties. We call this strategy undertaken by
U and V retaliation.
With the initial strategy of staying honest or cheating and the follow-up strategy
of possible retaliation, there are four possible combinations for each player or a total
of 16 different interaction outcomes between both of them. All possible cases are
listed in Table 5.1 with CU , CV = 1 represent cheating and RU , RV = 1 represents
retaliation.
Among the different combinations, there are cases that we believe are unlikely. We
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Table 5.1: Different Outcomes in User-Vendor Games
Case CU CV RU RV Outcome
1 0 0 0 0 D
2 0 0 0 1 X
3 0 0 1 0 X
4 0 0 1 1 A
5 0 1 0 0 E
6 0 1 0 1 X
7 0 1 1 0 X
8 0 1 1 1 A
9 1 0 0 0 C
10 1 0 0 1 X
11 1 0 1 0 X
12 1 0 1 1 A
13 1 1 0 0 B
14 1 1 0 1 X
15 1 1 1 0 X
16 1 1 1 1 A
mark these unlikely cases with outcome X based on the an-eye-for-an-eye assumption:
if one party retaliates by filing charges for a suspected cheating offense, the other party
will retaliate with a counter-lawsuit. This simplistic world-view is based on the fact
that a player must be made aware of the retaliation action from the other and the only
rational reaction to protect oneself is to countersue. This is also supported in real life
by the large number of litigation, especially in the United States, from simple small-
claim charges to multinational patent infringement lawsuits between companies [33].
Based on this assumption, case 2, 3, 6, 7, 10, 11, 14, 15 from Table 5.1 are excluded
from further considerations.
For the remaining cases, the goal is to investigate the preference of different out-
comes in order to derive the optimal strategies [136]. We group the remaining cases
into five possible classes of outcomes from A through E. Case 4, 8, 12 and 16 all
involve mutual retaliation with outcomes ultimately decided by an external entity
(court). Since the process is likely to be long, tedious and highly uncertain, we make
the assumption that any case with mutual retaliation always results in the least desir-
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able outcome and collectively label these outcomes A. The assumption that retaliation
is undesirable does not imply that cheater can ignore such a possibility. Rather, it
means that both players will either avoid this outcome by staying honest or retaliating
if the evidence against the other is overwhelming and the value of the secret is higher
than the cost of retaliation. The decision to retaliate is at the heart of our mechanism
design. Its mathematical underpinning will be discussed later in this section.
The remaining four outcomes do not involve any retaliation, which means that
the computation completes successfully and each party gets rewarded for carrying
out his/her task. To study the preference ranking of these outcomes, we assume the
perspective of U because the case for V is identical. To consider possible preference
orders, we first use a cost and benefit analysis to eliminate unlikely orders and then
analyze the remaining ones using different games to study the equilibrium strategies.
From the perspective of U , a rational judgement on the preference would be based
on the relative values between the two secrets and the additional cost associated with
cheating. While U clearly knows the value of his secret, his estimate of V ’s secret is
imprecise. In addition, the value of the secret depends on whether the secret holder
decides to collude and cheat – it is unlikely that a cheater will put forth a genuine
secret in the joint computation. The cost of cheating would include additional cost
to get the majority of the computing agents into a collusion.
While outcome A is the least desirable, outcome C is the most desirable because
U also successfully steals V ’s secret and suffers no consequence. As V is honest, V ’s
secret should be of high enough value to cover U ’s cost in collusion if this collusion
attack is a rational act. All the other outcomes are not as good: outcome D represents
the case when U is honest without any additional gain, though it is the socially optimal
behavior; outcome E represents the case when U is honest and suffers a loss as his
secret was stolen by V ; outcome B represents the case when both U and V cheat and
steal each other’s secret. Note that for this case V ’s secret may not be of high enough
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value to cover U ’s cost because V cheats. While it is clear that outcome D should be
ranked higher than E, it is unclear where outcome B should be. In summary, there
are three preference orders we need to consider:
C  D  E  B  A (5.1)
C  D  B  E  A (5.2)
and
C  B  D  E  A (5.3)
where the symbol  denotes “is preferred over”. The three preference orders differ in
the ranking of outcome B. A useful way to understand these orders is based on the
cost of collusion. The first order (5.1) ranks B the lowest because the high cost of
collusion exceeds even the damage of losing one’s own secret in E. On the other hand,
the last order (5.3) implies that the collusion cost is lower that the gain of stealing
the secret from the dishonest V and results in a net gain for U . From the viewpoint
of mechanism design, it is intuitive to make collusion cost as high as possible for
deterrence, which will be the subject of Sections 6.1 and 6.2. In the remainder of this
section, we study how retaliation impacts the strategies of honesty versus cheating
for different preference orders.
Symmetric Games
In this subsection, we study the initial strategy of staying honest versus cheating under
possible retaliation, assuming that all the players have the same preference order. The
follow-on strategy of retaliation involves complicated factors including the detection
of collusion attacks and the availability of evidence in support of retaliation. Due to
the difficulty in modeling the payoff utility for retaliation, we instead model it as a
parameter q and study its relationship with other factors. Specifically, we define q as
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the “non-retaliate” probability for both U and V , conditioned on the other’s cheating
behavior. The extreme value q = 1 means that no one retaliates while q = 0 means
that one always retaliates if his/her secret is stolen. A useful alternative interpretation
of q is to view it as the normalized reward for cheating, which is only worthwhile if the
cheater can get away with the retaliation. We are ignoring the scenario of retaliation
in the absence of cheating behaviors (case 4 in Table 5.1) – we believe that this is
an extremely unlikely situation considering that retaliation is the most undesirable
outcome.
As we have five outcomes to consider, we denote the normalized utility values
for these outcomes as 0 = p0 < p1 < p2 < p3 < p4 = 1. For the three preference
orders corresponding to high collusion cost (5.1), medium collusion cost (5.2) to low
collusion cost (5.3), the mappings of the utility values to the three cases can be easily
deduced and are shown in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2: Normalized Utility of Different Outcomes in User-Vendor Games
U ’s Preference
Strategies High cost (5.1) Mid cost (5.2) Low cost (5.3)
Retaliate (A) p0 p0 p0
Both cheat (B) p1 p2 p3
U cheats only (C) p4 p4 p4
No one cheats (D) p3 p3 p2
V cheats only (E) p2 p1 p1
Each of the three assignments can form a two-player, two-strategy symmetric
strategic form game. There are many possible solutions to such games. In this section,
we consider their solutions under Nash Equilibrium and derive the conditions that
lead to honesty being the stable strategy for both players. The detailed proof can be
found in Section 5.1.
Theorem 5.1.1. (honest, honest) is a Nash Equilibrium if
1. p3 ≥ q for order (5.1);
2. p3 > q, or p3 = q and p1 > qp2 for order (5.2);
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3. p2 > q, or p2 = q and p1 > qp3 for order (5.3).
Theorem 5.1.1 can be interpreted as follows: it can be shown that (p3, p3, p2)
represents the payoff for both players being honest with preference order (5.1), (5.2)
and (5.3) respectively. On the other hand, the average payoff of a successful cheating
can be shown as q for all three orders, i.e. one player cheating without any retaliation.
Thus, the strict inequality in all three orders implies that honesty is stable if both
players being honest has strictly higher payoff than the successful stealing of other’s
secret. Theorem 5.1.1 is important because making p3 high by providing and paying
for high-quality services, and providing state-of-the-art theft tracking technology such
as watermarking to make q small are both reasonable mechanisms in maintaining a
viable market. There are situations when thefts of secrets are hard to prove because
the stolen secret is never resold, but merely provides knowledge to the thief, such as
the case of a software vendor trying to find out new technology from a competitor.
Such undetectable thefts make it difficult to keep q small. Additional mechanisms to
tackle such scenarios will be described in Section 6.1.
As the payoffs are real values, all the equality cases are of marginal interest.
However, due to the symmetric nature of the game, the conditions become very
important if cheating behavior is already rampant:
Theorem 5.1.2. (cheat, cheat) is a Nash Equilibrium if
1. qp2 > p1, or qp2 = p1 and q > p3 for (5.2);
2. qp3 > p1, of qp3 = p1 and q > p2 for (5.3).
(Cheat, cheat) is not a Nash Equilibrium for (5.1).
For (5.2) and (5.3), qp2 and qp3 respectively represent the average payoff of mutual
theft while p1 represents the payoff of both players losing their secrets. Thus, cheating
is a NE if mutual theft has strictly higher utility than losing one’s secret. If the two
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utilities are equal, cheating is still a NE if a successful theft has higher utility than
both being honest.
For a poorly developed and managed market, it is quite possible that the majority
of the population has already engaged in dishonest behaviors. Theorem 5.1.2 shows
that it is very difficult to turn things around because the condition to maintain the
cheating behaviors is easily satisfied: the sole reason of the existence of a marketplace
in providing privacy-preserving computation is that the participants value the privacy
of their data. This means that losing those data can cause significant harm and p1
must be very small. Despite efforts of making q small, the low to medium costs of
collusion could keep p3 for (5.2) or p2 for (5.3) significantly higher than p1. There
are two lessons to be learned from the point of view of mechanism design: first,
it is important to maintain honesty as majority by growing the initial market with
substantial subsidy. Second, additional mechanisms are required to make collusion
harder and they will be discussed in Sections 6.1 and 6.2.
Finally, when none of the above conditions are met, as in the case when the value
of a secret cannot be a-priori determined, there could be a robust fraction of cheating
behaviors in the population based on the following Corollary.
Corollary 5.1.3. If none of the conditions in Theorems 5.1.1 and 5.1.2 are met, the
NE is a mixed strategy.
The proofs of Theorems 5.1.1 and 5.1.2 as well as Corollary 5.1.3 can be found
in the Appendix. Simulation results demonstrating different NE’s can be found in
Section 7.2.
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Proofs of Theorems 5.1.1, 5.1.2, and 5.1.3
Preference order (5.1)
We first consider the case of C  D  E  B  A. The normal form game can be
described by the payoff matix 5.3.
Table 5.3: Payoff matrix for order (5.1)
V
U
Honest Cheat
Honest (p3, p3)
(1− q)(p0, p0)
+q(p2, p4)
= (qp2, q)
Cheat
(1− q)(p0, p0)
+q(p4, p2)
= (q, qp2)
(1− q2)(p0, p0)
+q2(p1, p1)
= (q2p1, q
2p1)
The two-tuple in each entry indicates the average payoffs of U and V when adopt-
ing the row and column strategies respectively. In the context of a population game,
cheating would be a NE if (a) q2p1 > qp2 or (b) q
2p1 = qp2 and q > p3. As
0 ≤ p1, q ≤ 1, neither condition is valid and cheating can never be a NE. Hon-
esty would be a NE if (c) p3 > q or (d) p3 = q and qp2 > q
2p1. As qp2 > q
2p1 is
always true, we have the following conclusion: Honesty is a NE for both U and
V if p3 ≥ q. When the theft is undetectable, i.e. p3 < q, it can be shown that the
following mixed strategy constitutes a NE:
hu = hv =
1
q−p3
q(p2−qp1) + 1
(5.4)
where hu and hv are the honest fraction of U and V respectively. Unfortunately,
this situation will undoubtedly occur in real life. It is thus important to incorporate
additional mechanisms to deter cheating behaviors.
Preference order (5.2)
In this subsection we examine the case of C  D  B  E  A. Actually we
need to examine only the interpretation of B  E, as others remain the same. The
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motivation behind such an order is that U now gets more information – the secret
of V – in outcome “B” than in outcome “E”, although in both cases U loses his/her
own secret. The payoff matrix is described in Table 5.4.
Table 5.4: Payoff matrix for order (5.2)
V
U
Honest Cheat
Honest (p3, p3)
(1− q)(p0, p0)
+q(p1, p4)
= (qp1, q)
Cheat
(1− q)(p0, p0)
+q(p4, p1)
= (q, qp1)
(1− q2)(p0, p0)
+q2(p2, p2)
= (q2p2, q
2p2)
To make the honest strategy a NE, we must have either (a) p3 > q, or (b) p3 = q
and qp1 > q
2p2, i.e. p1 > qp2 = p2p3. For cheating to be a NE, either (c) q
2p2 > qp1,
i.e. qp2 > p1, or (d) q
2p2 = qp1 and q > p3, i.e. p1 > p2p3 and q > p3. While the
equality constraints may be hard to achieve in real-life, condition (c) is possible with
a high enough q. Thus, cheating is still possible. If none of the above conditions are
satisfied, the NE is a mixed strategy with the honest fraction as follows:
hu = hv =
1
q−p3
q(p1−qp2) + 1
(5.5)
Preference order (5.3)
In this subsection we examine the case of C  B  D  E  A. With B  D, we
have the situation that both cheating is preferred over both being honest. The payoff
matrix is shown in Table 5.5.
Table 5.5: Payoff matrix for order (5.3)
V
U
Honest Cheat
Honest (p2, p2)
(1− q)(p0, p0)
+q(p1, p4)
= (qp1, q)
Cheat
(1− q)(p0, p0)
+q(p4, p1)
= (q, qp1)
(1− q2)(p0, p0)
+q2(p3, p3)
= (q2p3, q
2p3)
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To make the honest strategy a NE, either (a) p2 > q, or (b) p2 = q and qp1 > q
2p3,
i.e. p1 > qp3 = p2p3, which are possible to obtain. For cheating to be a NE, either
(c) q2p3 > qp1, i.e. qp3 > p1, or (d) q
2p3 = qp1 and q > p2, i.e. p1 = qp3 > p2p3. Note
that conditions (b) and (d) are the same except that (b) requires p2 = q which is
difficult to sustain, so the situation is that both populations of honesty and cheating
coexist. The honest fraction is expressed in the general solution:
hu = hv =
1
q−p2
q(p1−qp3) + 1
(5.6)
5.2 User-Vendor Bayesian Games
In the previous section, we assume both players share the same preference order.
This assumption enables us to use relatively straightforward analysis to compute the
Nash Equilibrium. However, in many situations, customers U and V may not be
able to tell the other player’s preferences. The preference order of a player may
change depending on the secret data used in the computation. A player open to the
possibility of cheating may also adopt a different preference order, and wants to keep
this information private. Such unknown private information of the opponent can be
viewed as the opponent’s type used in the Bayesian game as described in Section 4.1.
Of course, a player knows his/her own type, or in this case, the preference order.
Interactions between players with private types known only to him/herself should
be taken into account in designing anti-collusion mechanisms. This is especially
necessary during the initial stage of the secure MPC marketplace in question where
customers are mostly new.
In this section, we analyze all possible Bayesian Games between U and V derived
from our framework from the perspective of U , since V ’s conclusion is analogous.
There are a total of three Bayesian Games according to U ’s three different possible
preference orders, i.e. (5.1), (5.2), and (5.3). Instead of Nash Equilibrium, the analysis
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will focus on strongly dominant equilibria as they are independent of the prior belief
of the opponent’s type. Recall that 0 = p0 < p1 < p2 < p3 < p4 = 1 stands for the
five different utilities for the five outcomes in a specific preference order. Using the
solution concept of dominant strategy equilibrium introduced in Definition 4.1.4 and
4.1.5, we obtained the following results.
Theorem 5.2.1. For the Bayesian User-Vendor game, the conditions for honesty to
be a strongly dominant strategy for a player regardless of his preference order are
{
p1 > qp3
p2 > q. (5.7)
The detailed proof of Theorem 5.2.1 can be found in Appendix 5.2. Simulation
results demonstrating different Bayesian Games can be found in Section 7.2. Com-
pared with the symmetric case in Theorem 5.1.1, we can see that the Bayesian result
is dominated by the conditions required by the preference order 5.3. The reason is
that this preference order represents the lowest collusion cost and the conditions of a
strongly dominant strategy must consider the worst case scenarios. Once again, the
key to deterring collusion is to keep q as low as possible or to make detection of a
theft highly robust. However, as pointed out earlier, some collusion attacks may not
be detectable at all and as such, retaliation mechanism alone is insufficient. Thus,
we have designed further mechanisms to reinforce the anti-collusion efforts, which are
described in the following sections. Finally, we skip the Bayesian analysis for cheat-
ing as a dominant strategy because it is very similar but of less interest in building a
sustainable market.
Proofs of User-Vendor Bayesian Games
We describe the first User-Vendor Bayesian Games in details, since the other two
Bayesian Games are to be analyzed in a very similar way. Let us denote preferences
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(5.1), (5.2), and (5.3) as x, y, and, z in this section. Denote ΘU as the private type of
player U . The private type in our framework is the choice of one’s preference order.
U has type ΘU = x
First, suppose the type of U is ΘU = x. To U , V ’s type set is ΘV = {x, y, z},
which records all three possible types of V . The remaining problem for U is to
guess a priori how likely each type of V will be. Given U ’s own type ΘU = x,
denote U ’s belief probabilities over V ’s possible types as α(x|x) = r, α(y|x) = s, and
α(z|x) = 1− r− s = t, where 0 ≤ r, s ≤ 1. The utility functions for Bayesian Games
when U has type x are defined by three type games, formulated in Tables 5.6, 5.7,
5.8. They represent interactions between ΘU = x and ΘV = x, ΘU = x and ΘV = y,
and ΘU = x and ΘV = z, respectively.
Table 5.6: Bayesian Game for ΘU = x against ΘV = x
V
U
Honest Cheat
Honest (p3, p3)
(1− q)(p0, p0)
+q(p2, p4)
= (qp2, q)
Cheat
(1− q)(p0, p0)
+q(p4, p2)
= (q, qp2)
(1− q2)(p0, p0)
+q2(p1, p1)
= (q2p1, q
2p1)
Table 5.7: Bayesian Game for ΘU = x against ΘV = y
V
U
Honest Cheat
Honest (p3, p3)
(1− q)(p0, p0)
+q(p2, p4)
= (qp2, q)
Cheat
(1− q)(p0, p0)
+q(p4, p1)
= (q, qp1)
(1− q2)(p0, p0)
+q2(p1, p2)
= (q2p1, q
2p2)
The utilities for U are denoted as UU,ΘU=x(SU ;SV ). It is the total expected utility
for U under his/her type x when U plays his/her strategy SU against V ’s various
strategy profile SV . SV has three component strategies (SVx , SVy , SVz), each repre-
senting a strategy for a type of V . For example, UU,ΘU=x(H;H,H,H) means U plays
59
Table 5.8: Bayesian Game for ΘU = x against ΘV = z
V
U
Honest Cheat
Honest (p3, p2)
(1− q)(p0, p0)
+q(p2, p4)
= (qp2, q)
Cheat
(1− q)(p0, p0)
+q(p4, p1)
= (q, qp1)
(1− q2)(p0, p0)
+q2(p1, p3)
= (q2p1, q
2p3)
H and V plays strategy H for type x, H for type y, and H for type z. Then the
utility of U under the above strategies is calculated as follows,
UU,ΘU=x(H;H,H,H) = ruU(x, x;H,H)
+ suU(x, y;H,H)
+ tuU(x, z;H,H)
= (r + s+ t)p3 = p3 (5.8)
where uU(x, x;H,H) means the utility for U in the type game ΘU = x against ΘV = x,
when the matching strategies are (H,H).
Similarly, we can proceed to calculate all utilities for the Bayesian Games of
ΘU = x, summarized in Table 5.9.
Table 5.9: Utilities in Bayesian Games of ΘU = x
Strategy Profile UU,ΘU=x(SU = H;SV ) UU,ΘU=x(SU = C;SV )
(SU ;H,H,H) p3 q
(SU ;H,H,C) rp3 + sp3 + tqp2 rq + sq + tq
2p1
(SU ;H,C,H) rp3 + sqp2 + tp3 rq + sq
2p1 + tq
(SU ;H,C,C) rp3 + sqp2 + tqp2 rq + sq
2p1 + tq
2p1
(SU ;C,H,H) rqp2 + sp3 + tp3 rq
2p1 + sq + tq
(SU ;C,H,C) rqp2 + sp3 + tqp2 rq
2p1 + sq + tq
2p1
(SU ;C,C,H) rqp2 + sqp2 + tp3 rq
2p1 + sq
2p1 + tq
(SU ;C,C,C) rqp2 + sqp2 + tqp2 rq
2p1 + sq
2p1 + tq
2p1
The solution concept we are to use is the strong dominant strategy equilibrium,
introduced in Definitions 4.1.4 and 4.1.5. The solution is in such a strong sense that it
results in a stable choice of strategy of one player regardless of what the other player
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chooses to play. Specifically for our User-Vendor Bayesian Games, the ideal strong
dominant strategy would be staying honest, summarized in Table 5.10.
Table 5.10: Ideal Solutions for Bayesian Games for All Possible ΘU
Honesty vs Cheating
UU,ΘU (H;H,H,H) > UU,ΘU (C;H,H,H)
UU,ΘU (H;H,H,C) > UU,ΘU (C;H,H,C)
UU,ΘU (H;H,C,H) > UU,ΘU (C;H,C,H)
UU,ΘU (H;H,C,C) > UU,ΘU (C;H,C,C)
UU,ΘU (H;C,H,H) > UU,ΘU (C;C,H,H)
UU,ΘU (H;C,H,C) > UU,ΘU (C;C,H,C)
UU,ΘU (H;C,C,H) > UU,ΘU (C;C,C,H)
UU,ΘU (H;C,C,C) > UU,ΘU (C;C,C,C)
Recall 0 ≤ r, s ≤ 1, t = 1− r− s, and 0 = p0 < p1 < p2 < p3 < p4 = 1. To achieve
the goal of making the pure honest strategy dominant expressed in Table 5.10, the
condition would be to have p3 > q. This can be verified by comparing the utilities of
the two strategies, “H” and “C”, for U under all possible opponent strategy profiles
in the two columns in Table 5.9.
Analogously, we can find conditions for the honest strategy under U ’s two remain-
ing Bayesian Games when U ’s types are y and z.
U has type ΘU = y
For the Bayesian Games of ΘU = y, the three type of games are listed in Tables 5.11,
5.12, and 5.13.
Table 5.11: Bayesian Game for ΘU = y against ΘV = x
V
U
Honest Cheat
Honest (p3, p3)
(1− q)(p0, p0)
+q(p1, p4)
= (qp1, q)
Cheat
(1− q)(p0, p0)
+q(p4, p2)
= (q, qp2)
(1− q2)(p0, p0)
+q2(p2, p1)
= (q2p2, q
2p1)
The utilities for U under ΘU = y are summarized in Table 5.14.
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Table 5.12: Bayesian Game for ΘU = y against ΘV = y
V
U
Honest Cheat
Honest (p3, p3)
(1− q)(p0, p0)
+q(p1, p4)
= (qp1, q)
Cheat
(1− q)(p0, p0)
+q(p4, p1)
= (q, qp1)
(1− q2)(p0, p0)
+q2(p2, p2)
= (q2p2, q
2p2)
Table 5.13: Bayesian Game for ΘU = y against ΘV = z
V
U
Honest Cheat
Honest (p3, p2)
(1− q)(p0, p0)
+q(p1, p4)
= (qp1, q)
Cheat
(1− q)(p0, p0)
+q(p4, p1)
= (q, qp1)
(1− q2)(p0, p0)
+q2(p2, p3)
= (q2p2, q
2p3)
Table 5.14: Utilities in Bayesian Game, ΘU = y
Strategy Profile UU,ΘU=y(SU = H;SV ) UU,ΘU=y(SU = C;SV )
(SU ;H,H,H) p3 q
(SU ;H,H,C) rp3 + sp3 + tqp1 rq + sq + tq
2p2
(SU ;H,C,H) rp3 + sqp1 + tp3 rq + sq
2p2 + tq
(SU ;H,C,C) rp3 + sqp1 + tqp1 rq + sq
2p2 + tq
2p2
(SU ;C,H,H) rqp1 + sp3 + tp3 rq
2p2 + sq + tq
(SU ;C,H,C) rqp1 + sp3 + tqp1 rq
2p2 + sq + tq
2p2
(SU ;C,C,H) rqp1 + sqp1 + tp3 rq
2p2 + sq
2p2 + tq
(SU ;C,C,C) rqp1 + sqp1 + tqp1 rq
2p2 + sq
2p2 + tq
2p2
It is when p3 > q and p1 > qp2 that the honest strategy becomes dominant
against all possible strategy profiles of V . As such, the goal of making the pure
honest strategy dominant expressed in Table 5.10 is fulfilled. This can be verified by
comparing the utilities of the two strategies, “H” and “C”, for U under all possible
opponent strategy profiles in the two columns in Table 5.14.
U has type ΘU = z
Lastly, let’s examine the Bayesian Games of ΘU = z. The three type games are
presented in Tables 5.15, 5.16, and 5.17.
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Table 5.15: Bayesian Game for ΘU = z against ΘV = x
V
U
Honest Cheat
Honest (p2, p3)
(1− q)(p0, p0)
+q(p1, p4)
= (qp1, q)
Cheat
(1− q)(p0, p0)
+q(p4, p2)
= (q, qp2)
(1− q2)(p0, p0)
+q2(p3, p1)
= (q2p3, q
2p1)
Table 5.16: Bayesian Game for ΘU = z against ΘV = y
V
U
Honest Cheat
Honest (p2, p3)
(1− q)(p0, p0)
+q(p1, p4)
= (qp1, q)
Cheat
(1− q)(p0, p0)
+q(p4, p1)
= (q, qp1)
(1− q2)(p0, p0)
+q2(p3, p2)
= (q2p3, q
2p2)
Table 5.17: Bayesian Game for ΘU = z against ΘV = z
V
U
Honest Cheat
Honest (p2, p2)
(1− q)(p0, p0)
+q(p1, p4)
= (qp1, q)
Cheat
(1− q)(p0, p0)
+q(p4, p1)
= (q, qp1)
(1− q2)(p0, p0)
+q2(p3, p3)
= (q2p3, q
2p3)
The utilities for U under ΘU = z are summarized in Table 5.18.
Table 5.18: Utilities in Bayesian Game, ΘU = z
Strategy Profile UU,ΘU=y(SU = H;SV ) UU,ΘU=y(SU = C;SV )
(SU ;H,H,H) p2 q
(SU ;H,H,C) rp2 + sp2 + tqp1 rq + sq + tq
2p3
(SU ;H,C,H) rp2 + sqp1 + tp2 rq + sq
2p3 + tq
(SU ;H,C,C) rp2 + sqp1 + tqp1 rq + sq
2p3 + tq
2p3
(SU ;C,H,H) rqp1 + sp2 + tp2 rq
2p3 + sq + tq
(SU ;C,H,C) rqp1 + sp2 + tqp1 rq
2p3 + sq + tq
2p3
(SU ;C,C,H) rqp1 + sqp1 + tp2 rq
2p3 + sq
2p3 + tq
(SU ;C,C,C) rqp1 + sqp1 + tqp1 rq
2p3 + sq
2p3 + tq
2p3
The conditions p2 > q and p1 > qp3 makes the honest strategy the dominant
one against all possible strategy profiles of V . Hence, the goal of making the pure
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honest strategy dominant expressed in Table 5.10 is fulfilled. This can be verified by
comparing the utilities of the two strategies, “H” and “C”, for U under all possible
opponent strategy profiles in the two columns in Table 5.18.
In conclusion, for all three possible types of U and all possible strategy profiles of
V , the conditions for honesty to be dominant are

p1 > qp2
p1 > qp3
p3 > p2 > q (5.9)
It can be simplified as {
p1 > qp3
p2 > q. (5.10)
64
Chapter 6 Collusion Deterrence Mechanisms for Computing Agents
6.1 Customer-Agent Game
For U to be successful in stealing V ’s secret, U must be able to convince t or more
agents to collude with him/her. A collusion attack can thus be avoided if the agents
refuse to collude. Such a collusion avoidance tactic is highly desirable as it does not
rely on after-the-fact retaliation that hinges on the detection of the theft. To deter
agents from colluding with customers, we introduce honest undercover customers (po-
lice) that attempt to collude with agents. A cheating agent who is reported by either
a police customer or an honest customer will be paid nothing and will be banned from
the system. This worst outcome is denoted by v0. Let λ be the conditional probabil-
ity of encountering police given a colluding request from the customer. For the case
when there is no colluding request from the customer, the conditional probability of
encountering police is 0 as a police customer is assumed to always attempt to collude
with the agents. The payoff matrix for the customer-agent game is given in Table
6.1.
Table 6.1: Customer-Agent Game
A
U
Honest Cheat
Honest (v1, v1) (v0, v0)
Cheat
λ · (v1, v1)+
(1− λ)(v1, v1)
= (v1, v1)
λ · (v0, v0)+
(1− λ)(v2, v2)
= (1− λ, 1− λ)
The normalized payoffs are represented as 0 = v0 < v1 < v2 = 1, and are assumed,
for simplicity, to be the same for both user and agents. (honest, honest) is clearly
a NE of this game. In fact, honesty becomes a strongly dominant strategy for the
agent if v1 > 1− λ. This is the most desirable outcome, brought on by a large λ or a
significant presence of police. On the other hand, v1 ≤ 1−λ will make (cheat, cheat)
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another NE of the game. Such an unfortunate situation will occur when there are
not enough police or the payoff for an honest agent is significantly smaller than that
of collusion.
The suggested strategy of inserting police to track dishonest agents finds its par-
allel in real life. In network security, honeypot servers are routinely used to decoy
network attacks towards a well-isolated and monitored area so as to collect infor-
mation that may lead to ultimate apprehension of the attackers. In fact, game the-
ory has been routinely used in analyzing the strategic use and placement of honey-
pots [55, 139, 130, 79, 26]. Using the hierarchical structure of today’s internet, some
researchers argued that only a small number of honeypot servers at network core can
thwart most network attacks [139]. This points to the interesting possibility of in-
corporating network topology into our agent-based secure MPC framework to further
reduce the number of police customers, a subject worthy of further investigation.
6.2 Censorship
The collusion deterrence games in Chapter 5 focuses on strategies to promote honest
behavior among users. However, even if all the users are honest, the computing agents
themselves can collude to steal secrets as described the A3 attacks scenario in Sec-
tion 4.2. During reconstruction or renormalization, agents are supposed to exchange
information with each other. Unlike the A1 attacks, agents do not have any pre-
existing side-channels and as such, they might try to collude by sending subliminal
messages within the protocol. A trivial solution is to simply prohibit communica-
tion among agents. This solution works for only simple computation protocols in
which renormalization is not necessary. Verifiable secret sharing [32] does not work
for renormalization either, as the dishonest agent has the freedom in setting a few
semantically meaningful new shares (say to its IP address) while maintaining perfect
reconstruction of its original share.
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In this section, we propose a simple censorship scheme to delegate the task of
renormalization to a more “trusted” entity. With a properly designed game-based
mechanism as described in Sections 5.1 and 5.2, we assume that the customers U
and V are deterred from colluding with the agents and use the semi-honest model for
their possible adversarial behaviors. However, they still have a strong incentive to
safeguard their secrets and keep all of the agents honest. As such, U (or V ) can carry
out the task of renormalization by injecting fresh noise into the shares to destroy
any subliminal messages. The proposed censorship scheme requires processing and
routing messages of agents through U and V . Suppose the underlying protocol is the
(t, n) SSS where n is the number of computing agents and t is the original threshold
of the SSS. The censorship scheme is described in Protocol 1.
Protocol 1 frenormalize
1: Each agent Ai for i = 1, . . . , n has a secret share [u]
p
i based on a random p-degree
polynomial with t− 1 ≤ p ≤ n− 1.
2: U selects a uniformly random number rU and sends its shares [rU ]
t
i to Ai.
3: V selects a uniformly random number rV and sends its shares [rV ]
t
i to Ai.
4: Ai computes [u]
p
i + [rU ]
t
i + [rV ]
t
i mod m = [u+ rU + rV ]
p
i and sends to U .
5: For each i, U computes mi,j = [[u + rU + rV ]
p
i ]
t
j and sends them to Aj for j =
1, . . . , n.
6: Ai receives mi,j from U for j = 1, . . . , n and compute si =
∑n
j=1 γjmi,j − [rU ]ti −
[rU ]
t
i mod m where γj’s are the Lagrange interpolation coefficient for polynomial
of degree p.
Before presenting the security proof, we discuss the complexity of this protocol.
Our protocol has 4n invocations of communication in each renormalization compared
to n(n − 1) in the original one without any collusion-deterrence. The reduction in
the number of invocations (for n > 5) is due to the fact that the centralization of the
responsibility to U enables multiple messages to the same agents be combined in Step
5. Our scheme is different from the mediator solution in [3] as we are using a building
block that is different from a secure two-party protocol. While it does involve the
participation of a secret holder, our scheme is of much lower complexity as it is only
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needed for steps like renormalization and output.
Correctness
The correctness of Protocol 3 can be shown as follows: by our covert adversary
assumption, the agents will only deviate from the protocol if there is a non-zero
probability of launching a successful collusion attack. We will demonstrate later in
our security proof that it is impossible to do so. As such, we focus here on the correct
execution of the protocol. In step 4, the equation [u]pi + [rU ]
t
i + [rV ]
t
i mod m =
[u + rU + rV ]
p
i holds because p ≥ t − 1. Thus, the polynomials used to share rU
and rV can be considered to have degree p with zero leading terms so the additive
homomorphism holds. In step 5, U carries out the renormalization step to reduce the
degree of the polynomial back to t. In step 6, the first term reconstructs the noisy
share based on the renormalization formula (4.2):
n∑
j=1
γjmi,j =
n∑
j=1
γj[[u+ rU + rV ]
p
i ]
t
i
=
[
n∑
j=1
γj[u+ rU + rV ]
p
i
]t
i
= [u+ rU + rV ]
t
i
Then, using additive homomorphism, Ai obtains si = [u + rU + rV ]
t
i − [rU ]ti − [rU ]ti
mod m = [u]ti, which is the desired output of renormalization.
Security
The security proof of Protocol 1 is as follows: we assume that U and V are semi-
honest with the explicit goal of detecting any irregularities in agent traffic. The agents
hope to achieve collusion by deviating from the protocol and changing the outbound
messages, but will only do so if there is a non-zero probability of success. We assume
the worst case scenario in that all agents are interested in a collusion attack and are
aware of a common preamble to signal subliminal communication of information such
68
their own IP addresses. The proof follows the well-known simulation paradigm [60]
in which the distribution of any inbound messages at each party can be computed
based on the party’s knowledge obtained through the ideal functionality. Since U
and V are not involved in the ideal functionality of renormalization, they should not
gain any additional information about the underlying secret. As for the agents, the
ideal functionality should result in uniformly random shares of the same secret hidden
inside a t − 1 degree polynomial, or termination as a result of malicious behaviors
from some agents. Let us analyze the inbound messages received by each party as
described in Protocol 3.
V does not receive any messages so there is no security concern. All the agents
receive two rounds of independent uniformly random shares - first round are the
random shares from U and V and the second round are the renormalized shares
from U . They are independent uniformly random shares because no agent receives
more than t shares of any secret and it is assumed that both U and V carry out
the protocol faithfully. Lastly, U receives inbound messages from all agents. There
are two scenarios. For the first scenario, we assume all agents carry out the protocol
faithfully and U receives all the random shares of u+ rU + rV . While U can certainly
carry out the reconstruction, U cannot learn anything about u due to the presence
of uniformly random rV unknown to U . For the second scenario, all the agents may
decide to replace their messages with subliminal messages. While preambles known
to all agents can certainly be sent undetected by U , it is impossible for a single agent
to send an unique message because U will be able to detect inconsistency among
reconstructions based on different subgroups of t shares received. Even if U does
not check for any inconsistency, subliminal messages will be destroyed as they are
replaced by uniformly generated random shares in Step 5. In either scenario, U does
not gain any new knowledge about V ’s secret. As all the inbound messages to U and
the agents are statistically indistinguishable from those from the ideal functionality,
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we conclude that Protocol 3 is secure.
70
Chapter 7 Experiments
In this chapter, we first present a comparison in computation efficiency between our
Collusion-Deterred SSS (CD-SSS) and other state-of-the-arts computationally secure
SMC techniques. Then, we simulate how different strategies might evolve under
different conditions in the user-vendor games and the customer-agent game.
7.1 Computational Efficiency of CD-SSS versus GC
We first test the hypothesis that our CD-SSS system provides a more computationally-
efficient secure MPC system than other state-of-the-arts GC implementations, includ-
ing both TASTY [68] and ObliVM [83]. The choice of TASTY and ObliVM is based
on their performance and the availability of software. GC is primarily a 2-party secure
MPC scheme while our CD-SSS system requires at least 3 agents and 2 customers,
user and vendor. As the extra computing resources are not used for parallelization
but rather for matching the security access structure, we measure the performance
based on the actual wall clock time needed to complete the entire computation.
For the benchmark operations, we have chosen addition, multiplication, and com-
parison of two encrypted numbers. These three operations are universal and com-
monly used in literature as benchmarks. For our CD-SSS system, we assume that
the input numbers are already in shares and the operations complete with a recon-
struction. The implementations of addition and multiplication are straightforward
and based on the GNU MP library [64]. While we only use one-level deep multipli-
cation, we have included a renormalization step so that the number is representative
for arbitrary number of levels.
Comparison is more complicated and our algorithm is based on our earlier work in
[116]. Here we briefly review the procedure. Suppose v and w are two l-bit numbers
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to be compared and we rely on the radix-2 representations of the numbers. So the
bits of v and w are denoted as vi and wi for i = 0, 1, ..., l − 1. The computation is
performed bit by bit from the most significant bit. All the bits are already in shares
and the share computation is performed in the prime field F5. The algorithm uses
two state variables b and c to accumulate the intermediate result. Initially, b := 1 and
c := v0 − w0 + 1, which would be 2 if v0 > w0, 0 if v0 < w0, and 1 otherwise. For the
subsequent bits, we perform b := b·(1−vj−1⊕wj−1) followed by c := c·(vj−wj+2−b).
b is 1 until the corresponding bits from v and w begin to differ, and all the subsequent
b’s will be 0. vj−wj+2−b is 1 until the bits start to differ – it will be 0 if v < w and 2
if w > v. This leads to the final output c = 0 if and only if v < w. The above protocol
involves multiple random number generations, multiplications, renormalization, and
additions.
In the proposed CD-SSS, the user or vendor is responsible for renormalization and
reconstructions as discussed in Section 6.2, while the agents perform all the remaining
computation. We adopt a number of strategies to expedite the calculations. First, all
shared random numbers are pre-generated and distributed among the agents. Sec-
ond, as communication and synchronization are needed after comparing each bit, we
amortize the measurements over a large number of comparison operations in a bit-
wise fashion so as to minimize the communication overhead. To promote reproducible
research, we have made our CD-SSS implementation publicly available at our website.
We compare different techniques in two testbeds. The first testbed is on a virtual
1-Gbps LAN with up to 5 Linux nodes (1G Hz Dual-Core AMD Opteron with 2GB
RAM) on Deterlab [17]. The available TASTY software is unable to support the
Table 7.1: Deterlab Experiment
Time per operation CD-SSS ObliVM TASTY
Addition (1024 bits) 0.32 ms 806.4 ms 25.56 ms
Multiplication (1024 bits) 1.17 ms 1.587 s 8.602 s
Compare (16384 bit) 2.50 ms 7.671 s -
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comparison operations on such a wide operand. Table 7.1 shows that CD-SSS is 2
to 3 orders of magnitude faster than the two other GC methods. We also notice
that our measurements for ObliVM are significantly slower than the ones reported
in the original paper. As such, we attempt to normalize the platform by running
CD-SSS on Amazon EC2 computing nodes of types c4.8xlarge, the same computation
platform used in ObliVM. The results of ObliVM are directly cited from their original
paper [83]. The results are summarized in Table 7.2. CD-SSS remains significantly
Table 7.2: Amazon EC2 Experiment
Time per operation CD-SSS ObliVM
Addition (1024 bits) 8.1 µs 1.7 ms
Multiplication (1024 bits) 19.9 µs 833 ms
Comparison (16384 bits) 57.3 µs 26 ms
faster than ObliVM in addition and multiplication. However, the heavy network cost
on a shared network, as opposed to the dedicated network in Deterlab, has taken a
toll on comparison and the two schemes are much closer. As such, a key goal to design
a practical CD-SSS system is the minimization of the number of network invocations.
7.2 Simulations of Strategic Behaviors
In this section, we validate the conditions of different games studied in Section 5.1.
Instead of Nash Equilibria (NE), we focus our experiments on simulating the evolu-
tionary stable strategy (ESS). While these two solution concepts are based on different
conditions, an ESS, if it exists, must coincide with a NE. Also, we believe that this
is an appropriate approach because, for the distributed computing platform to be
economically viable, it will need to have a large number of customers. Among the
customers, those that provide proprietary software services are likely to be reviewed
by their clients and dishonest behaviors can result in poor customer ratings, lead-
ing to their ultimate demise. Typical consumers who want computing services on
their private information will need to use their credit cards to pay for the services.
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Again, any suspected cheating behaviors can ruin their credit scores. In other words,
while we model cheating versus staying honest as rational behaviors, bad behaviors
on a highly-social, well-connected distributed computing marketplace can affect the
decisions of other players. As such, we use EGT to model the population of all the
customers in this marketplace that are seeking and providing privacy-protected com-
puting services. The goal is to study how pervasive cheating behaviors can be in such
a marketplace. In our simulation, we use the replicator dynamic (RD) to simulate
the evolution from a given population profile under different conditions. Under RD,
the growth rate of the agents using each strategy is proportional to the excess of the
strategy’s payoff over the average payoff [136]. Our implementations are based on the
GameBug simulator [137].
We first illustrate how the system evolves over time for different User-Vendor
Games. Each user in the system is randomly matched with a vendor from the same
population for cooperations. Recall that q is the non-retaliation probability and pi is
the i-th ranked payoff. At the beginning of the simulation, 90% of the populations are
honest. We first test the scenario of preference ranking (5.1), with q ≤ p3. The initial
population profile evolves very quickly toward the pure-honesty ESS as depicted in
Fig. 7.1. In sharp contrast, q > p3 leads to a mixed ESS with hu = hv = 0.8. Fig. 7.2
shows this evolution in the population whose profile gradually converges to the mixed
ESS as marked by the black solid line. Second, we test the scenario using preference
ranking (5.2). Under the condition p3 > q, the honest strategy prevails quickly as
depicted in Fig. 7.3. Under the alternative honest condition p1 > p2p3 and p3 = q,
however, the honest behavior evolves very slowly as depicted in Fig. 7.4. Both the
conditions qp2 > p1 and p1 > p2p3 and q > p3 lead to the population evolve to
cheating, as depicted in Fig. 7.5. Third, we simulate preference ranking (5.3). The
honest condition p2 > q yields a relatively slow system evolution compared to the
previous two games, and the condition p1 > p2p3 and p2 = q has a even much slower
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evolution, as depicted in Fig. 7.6 and 7.7 respectively. The cheating conditions qp3 >
p1 or p1 > p2p3 and q > p2 have very similar effects, as depicted in Fig. 7.8.
The Bayesian Game when U is with preference order (5.1) is illustrated in Fig-
ure 7.9 under the condition p3 > q. The initial population is divided 50% against
50%, each playing “H” and “C”. The belief probabilities are set as r = s = t = 1/3.
They can be set arbitrarily and do not much affect the result. The system evolves
quickly to honest. For the other possible types of U , the honest conditions yields very
similar evolution.
Next, we simulate the Customer-Agent Game. Consider the case when v1 > 1−λ.
Setting 50% of the users and agents as honest initially, Fig. 7.10 shows that agents
evolve to honesty while users stay at a mixed strategy over time as predicted by the
non-strict NE. Second, for the case of v1 < 1−λ, Fig. 7.11 shows that the same initial
population composition of half cheating and half honest is gradually taken over by
cheating which is an ESS.
Figure 7.1: Emergent Behavior in User-Vendor Game One when q < p3
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Figure 7.2: Emergent Behavior in User-Vendor Game One when q > p3
Figure 7.3: Emergent Behavior in User-Vendor Game Two when q < p3
Figure 7.4: Emergent Behavior in User-Vendor Game Two when p1 > p2p3 and p3 = q
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Figure 7.5: Emergent Behavior in User-Vendor Game Two when either qp2 > p1 or
p1 > p2p3 and q > p3
Figure 7.6: Emergent Behavior in User-Vendor Game Three when q < p2
Figure 7.7: Emergent Behavior in User-Vendor Game Three when p1 > p2p3 and p2 = q
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Figure 7.8: Emergent Behavior in User-Vendor Game Three when either qp3 > p1 or
p1 > p2p3 and q > p2
Figure 7.9: Emergent Behavior in Bayesian Game Three when p3 > q
Figure 7.10: Emergent Behavior in the User-Agent game when p1 > 1− λ
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Figure 7.11: Emergent Behavior in the User-Agent game when p1 < 1− λ
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Chapter 8 Conclusion and Future Directions
In our construction of the censorship scheme, one of the customers, U or V , is re-
sponsible for censoring the messages among computing agents. While the proposed
scheme achieves information-theoretic security, it relies on U or V to carry out the
part of censorship that is necessary to the whole task. We would like to further reduce
the computing load of U and V in an outsourced scenario. This motivates our investi-
gations for new mechanisms that deter collusion among agents while further relieving
the burden of U and V . Specifically, we are interested in the outsourced computation
where there is only one secret owner U who gives the input to a computing platform.
In this chapter, we briefly describe our initial results of new collusion-deterrence
mechanisms as the starting point of future explorations. The basic idea is to have
multiple layers of computing agents. The upper level agents can communicate with
the immediate lower level agents, but the communication in the reverse direction
should be very difficult, thus making all communications one directional. We call it
Message Routing Mechanism and analyze its collusion deterrence using the coalition
game theory. Finally, we summarize this dissertation and point out future directions.
8.1 Message Routing Mechanism
In order to destroy collusions, we break down the collusion channels between agents.
The idea is to isolate agents so that whoever has the input secret shares cannot
communicate directly with another agent who also holds a secret input share. Specif-
ically, those who have secret shares do not know each other and whoever routes the
communication messages does not know anything of the secret shares. We designed
two schemes, called “Proxy” and “Relay”, from the above principle, in the following
two subsections respectively. We are interested in the task of Foutput (output a re-
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constructed value as described in (3.2)) and Frenorm (renormalization as described in
(4.2)). Since these two tasks involves communications among agents, they directly
correspond to the possible attacks described in Section 4.2. The reason is that by
the completeness theorems from [16] there are only three types of gates necessary
for SSS-based protocols: addition, scaling, and multiplication. All of the three gates
would lead to an output of a value, captured in Foutput, and for the multiplication
gate a reduce of degree is necessary which is captured by Frenorm. We now describe
two types of future Message Routing Mechanisms. The first is called Proxy and the
second is called Relay.
Proxy
The Proxy scheme has a set of computing agents Si for i = 1, ..., n and two other
agents P1 and P2 acting as proxies. Initially, U distributes input secret shares [a]i
to Si and P1 and P2 have no secret inputs but are responsible for routing messages
between Si whenever needed. Only two proxies are sufficient. Suppose we use a (t, n)
SSS. A well-known fact is that t ≤ dn/2e. In whatever step involving the proxies, P1
gets (t− 1) shares and P2 gets the remaining shares, so neither of them can learn the
secret. First, whenever the agents need an intermediate public value to be revealed,
they call Protocol of Output, described in Protocol (2). Second, suppose at each Si
some intermediate answer [x]di has reached a threshold d > dn2 e, so a renormalization
is needed. The computation of the final answer cannot be performed by these two
protocols. In fact, when all the computation is done, each Si sends back the share
of result [r]i to U who then use (3.2) to reconstruct the result. Then agents run
Protocol of Renormalization, described in Protocol (3). The computational case of
three agents with two proxies is depicted in Fig 8.1.
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Figure 8.1: Network topology for the Proxy scheme in the operation of renormalization: S1,2 send
shares to P1 while S3 sends to P2; then P1,2 distribute new shares back to all agents.
Protocol 2 Foutput implemented in Proxy
1: Si has a share of a public value [c]i, i ∈ {1, ..., n};
2: Si, i ∈ {1, ..., t}, sends [c]i to P1
3: P1 outputs c using Eq. (3.2)
4: P1 sends c to every Si;
5: S1,...,n continue to run the remaining program if any.
Protocol 3 Frenorm implemented in Proxy
1: [x]di for i = 1, . . . , dn2 e are sent to P1 and the rest to P2;
2: P1 and P2 generate the renormalized shares as follows:
[[x]di ]
t
j =
t−1∑
k=1
αkj
k + [x]di mod m, (8.1)
where αk are random numbers unknown to any Si;
3: [[x]di ]
t
j are then sent to Sj for i, j = 1, 2, . . . , n;
4: Sj computes the new [x]
t
j using Eq. (3.2);
5: S1,...,n continue to run the remaining program if any.
In the Proxy process, Si knows the shares [a]i but does not know IP of any Sj for
i 6= j. Pi does not have the initial [a]i. By virtue of the underlying SSS scheme, all
data at any participants are random numbers.
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Relay
The scheme of Proxy is suitable for cloud computing where three computing agents
and two proxies are sufficient. If we deploy the P2P setting where millions of peers
acting as computing agents, we can implement the Relay scheme. The following Relay
deploys three agents in parallel at a time, and it can be extended to the situation of
n agents at a time straightforwardly.
Suppose agents S1, S2, and S3 get initial input secret shares [a]i for i = 1, 2, 3
from U . First, for outputting a public number c for the task Foutput, the agents call
Protocol (4). The computational model and data flow is depicted in Fig. 8.2. Note
that all S4, S5, and S6 get are random shares [c]i but no initial secret shares [a]i,
hence the direct interactions among S4, S5, and S6 do not matter.
Second, Protocol (5) describes computing Frenorm, with the data flow and the
computational model in Fig. (8.3). Here again S1, S2, and S3 who has the initial
secret shares cannot communicate with each other for collusion, nor can S4, S5, and
S6. Note that Si for i = 4, ..., 9 does not have secret shares but only random numbers.
Finally, U gets shares of the final result from a final set of agents and reconstructs
the result. Note that if S1, S2, and S3 do not possess any secret shares, they can
do any renormalization and output without resorting to a next set of agents. This
observation can be used to simply specific SOC protocols.
Protocol 4 Foutput implemented in Relay
1: Si has a share of a public value [c]i, i ∈ {1, 2, 3};
2: [c]i, i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, is sent to Si for i ∈ {4, 5, 6} respectively;
3: S4,5,6 communicate to reconstruct c using Eq. (3.2);
4: S4,5,6 continue to run the remaining program if any.
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Figure 8.2: Network topology for the operation
of output
Figure 8.3: Network topology for the operation
of renormalization
Protocol 5 Frenorm implemented in Relay
1: S1,2,3 have [x]
d
i for i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and d > dn2 e;
2: Si sends [x]
d
i for i ∈ {1, 2, 3} to S4,5,6 respectively;
3: S4,5,6 use Eq. (8.1) to generate new shares which are received by S7,8,9;
4: S7,8,9 use Eq. (3.2) to get the renormalized [x]
t
i;
5: S7,8,9 continue to run the remaining program if any.
Regarding the complexity of our schemes compared with the original non-collusion-
deterred n−agent SSS, the Proxy will introduce 2n more invocations of communica-
tion in parallel in each round of renormalization, and two more invocations of com-
munication in parallel in each round of output. For Relay, it will incur 2n more
invocations of communication in parallel for each round of renormalization and n
more in perallel for each output. Compared to SSS with collusion-deterrence [134],
Proxy has the same communication complexity and Relay has (n − 2) more invoca-
tions in parallel in each output. At a first glance, Relay is more complex than Proxy.
However, the anti-collusion analysis in Section 8.1 will show it is more difficult for
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Table 8.1: Coalition Game in Proxy
Coalition Value
{S1, P1, S2} 1
All other T ⊆ N 0
agents in Relay to collude..
An example SOC task using our proposed schemes is to compute LTZ, the “com-
parison with zero” protocol [28]. Comparison is a performance bottleneck for SSS-
based protocols [28]. The LTZ algorithm for the Relay is modified from [28] so as
to adapt to our Relay. For Proxy, LTZ is the same as that for [134] except that
the proxies now take place for renormalizations and reconstructions of intermediate
values.
Coalition Game
First, we analyze the situation in Proxy. There is a game GP = (N,v) defined by a set
of players N = {S1, P1, S2}. Refer to Fig. 8.1 for the connections. Denote T ⊆ N as
any subset of players. S1,2 have the secret shares but no idea of the IP of each other.
If P1 is ignorant of the collusion request from S1,2 or refuses the request, then the
collusion chain is broken. So P1 is the veto player in GP . The characteristic function v
of GP is defined as shown in Tab. 8.1. The value has been normalized where “1” means
the highest possible value of collusion (for example, by selling the secret and then
divide the revenue among colluders) and “0” means nothing is achieved. Regarding
the solution of GP , denote the payoff vector as υ = (υS1 , υP1 , υS2). Hence, the core is
υc = (0, 1, 0), the nucleolus is υn = (0, 1, 0), and the SV is υS = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3).
The interpretation of GP from S1’s point of view includes: (1) S1 must pay to P1
what ever price P1 asks as suggested by the core and the nucleolus. (2) Isolated from
each other, S1 has no information of the coordination of actions of S2 and both are
advised to be honest because of the zero payoff from the core and the nucleolus. (3)
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Table 8.2: Coalition Game in Output of Relay
Coalition Value
{S1, S2, S4, S5} 1
All other I ⊆ J 0
Table 8.3: Coalition Game in Renormalization of Relay
Coalition Value
{S1, S2, S4, S5, S7} 1
All other H ⊆ K 0
The only cooperation solution is SV. If S2 also joins, it is fair to give P1 only 1/3 of
the value according to the SV. This thought will be a key point of future direction.
Second, let’s turn to the Relay scheme. There are two games, one for output and
another for renormalization.
Refer to Fig. 8.2 of output and consider the potential collusion between S1, S2,
since the situation is the same for any pair of agents from S1,2,3. Denote the game in
output as GO = (J,w) where J = {S1, S2, S4, S5}. The S4, S5 are veto players because
of their midway positions in the collusion chain. The characteristic function w is
defined in Tab 8.2. Denote the payoff vector for GO as τ = (τS1 , τS2 , τS4 , τS5). Hence,
the core is τ c = {(0, 0, x, 1−x); 0 ≤ x ≤ 1}, the nucleolus is τn = (0, 0, 1/2, 1/2), and
the SV is τS = (1/4, 1/4, 1/4, 1/4).
Refer to Fig. 8.3 for the renormalization in Relay. The collusion between S1 and S2
is even harder because now 3 veto players {S4, S5, S7} are in the setK = {S1,2,4,5,7,8} to
which the game GR = (K,x) will be defined, as shown in Tab. 8.3. Denote the payoff
vector for GR as ζ = (ζS1 , ζS2 , ζS4 , ζS5 , ζS7). Hence, the core is ζc = {(0, 0, x, y, 1−x−
y); 0 ≤ x, y ≤ 1 and x+ y = 1}, the nucleolus is ζn = (0, 0, 1/3, 1/3, 1/3), and the SV
is ζS = (1/5, 1/5, 1/5, 1/5, 1/5).
The interpretation of GO and GR from S1’s point of view is very similar to that in
GP . The core and the nucleolus suggest that S1 has nothing beneficial from collusion.
The SV basically says that S1 at most has a share of value of 1/4 and 1/5 for games
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GO and GR respectively. The SV in games in Relay also show that cheating gets
lower payoff than in Proxy. Intuitively this is because in Relay the collusion channel
is “longer” than that in Proxy, so it is more difficult to cheat in Relay.
It is possible that S1 may still try to persuade his/her next agent into collusion.
This problem is one of our future investigations.
8.2 Conclusion
Secure multi-party computation (secure MPC) has been established as the de facto
paradigm for protecting privacy in distributed computation. One of the earliest MPC
primitives is the Shamir’s secret sharing (SSS) scheme. SSS has many advantages over
other secure MPC primitives like garbled circuits and homomorphic encryption – it
provides an information-theoretic security (ITS) guarantee, requires no complex long-
integer operations, and often leads to more efficient protocols. We have provided a
summary of signal processing operations based on SSS as well as an example appli-
cation of image denoising in the SSS domain to demonstrate the usefulness of SSS in
protecting privacy in an outsourced environment. Nonetheless, ITS-MPC protocols
built from SSS receive less attention in the signal processing community because SSS
requires a larger number of honest participants, making it prone to collusion attacks.
In this dissertation, we have proposed an outsourced distributed computation
framework on secret data based on Shamir’s secret sharing. The key innovation is
a comprehensive modeling of different collusion attacks and countermeasures using
game-theoretic approaches. Two types of games, user-vendor and customer-agent,
have been studied. We provide a detailed analysis of possible outcomes under dif-
ferent privacy preferences based on the relative cost of collusion attacks over loss of
privacy. User-vendor games model the intention to commit collusion attacks with the
possibility of retaliation from the perspective of a customer. Using both symmetric
strategic form games and Bayesian games to model uncertainty in privacy preference,
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we have concluded that honesty is a stable strategy if it is possible to reliably detect
thefts, thereby keeping the cost of collusion high. For undetectable theft, we have
proposed a deception design to inject police customers into the framework. Using the
customer-agent game, we have concluded that honesty is a stable strategy for agents
under a significant presence of police. A cryptographic censorship protocol has also
been proposed to sanitize traffic so as to eliminate any collusion among agents under
a covert adversarial model. Our collusion deterred ITS-MPC framework based on
SSS is called CD-SSS. Experimental results have been provided to demonstrate the
efficiency of our proposed system over state-of-the-arts Garbled Circuit systems and
the validity of our game-theoretic constructions. Further investigations are needed
to confirm whether the proposed mechanisms accurately reflect practical applications
through the use of social computing experiments. Another important area of exten-
sion is to incorporate suitable network topology of agents into the framework. We
have already conducted preliminary studies on using network of agents in reducing
customers’ load in the censorship protocol [133]. Further extension of game-theoretic
designs to network could potentially relax conditions for honesty strategy.
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